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Designing a Carbon Tax: The 
Introduction of the Carbon-Burned 
Tax (CBT) 
Amy C. Christian* 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
A. 11ze Greenhouse Effect 
Our environment is under attack, and as the threats become more 
serious, we must find creative and effective ways to combat them. 
One possible approach is to structure the tax system to further envi-
ronmental objectives. One current environmental concern with po-
tentially serious global consequences is the greenhouse effect. This 
article focuses on the goal of environmental protection through re-
ducing carbon dioxide emissions from fuel combustion and on the 
goal of raising revenue for the govemment. 1 Light passes through 
carbon dioxide and other gases, including methane, chlorofluoro-
carbons (CFCs), and nitrous oxides, and heats the earth's surface. 
These gases then "absorb and reradiate the infrared energy emitted 
from the Earth's surface."2 An increase in these gases heats the 
earth's atmosphere and produces climate changes.3 
Carbon dioxide is the dominant greenhouse gas. Based on emission 
* Georgetown University, B.S.B.A., 1988; Haivard Law School, J.D., 1991. The au-
thor currently works in Washington, D.C. as a tax associate at a private law finn. 
1. These two goals, conservation and revenue raising, are in potential conflict. See 
discussion in section ll.B on the relationship between a broad tax base and tax level 
With regard to setting the amount of tax, conservation and revenue considerations di-
rectly conflict. Promoting conservation requires setting the tax at a relatively high level 
To the extent conservation goals are realized, less revenue will accrue to the govc:m-
ment. Taxing with a broad base and at high relative rates resolves the conflict to some 
extent by increasing the amount of revenue raised, while maintaining sufficient eco-
nomic incentives to conserve. Therefore, both goals can be pursued simultaneously if 
the tax applies broadly and at a sufficiently high level. 
2. Daniel B. Botkin, Global Wanning: What It Is. What Is Contro~·ersial About It, 
and What We Might Do In Response to It, 9 UCLA J. ENvn. L. & PoL'Y 119, 121 
(1991). 
3. See id. at 120. 
221 
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rates in the past decade, carbon dioxide accounts for an estimated 57 
percent of the increase in greenhouse gases that create the potential 
for global warming. Of the remaining worldwide emissions of green-
house gases, chlorofluorocarbons contribute about 24 percent and, to-
gether, methane and nitrous oxide account for approximately 19 
percent of the potential change in climate. Ozone, water vapor, and 
other trace gases may also contribute to the greenhouse effect • . . . 
Most of the carbon dioxide from man-made sources is emitted dur-
ing the burning of fossil fuels. Coal and oil, together, contribute ap-
proximately 84 percent of worldwide emissions of carbon dioxide 
from fossil fuels; the remainder is attributable to natural gas . . . • 
Worldwide deforestation from the cutting and burning of trees -
most of which is occuring in the tropical forests of South America, 
Asia, and Africa - is responsible for an estimated one-tenth to one-
third of man-made emissions of carbon dioxide. 
Not only the amount but also the type of fossil fuel burned affects 
the emissions of carbon dioxide. Since the carbon content of fossil 
fuels varies, the carbon energy obtained also varies. Natural gas has 
the lowest emissions of carbon dioxide per British thermal unit (Btu); 
oil emits about 40 percent more carbon dioxide than natural gas; and 
coal emits two to three times as much carbon dioxide as natural gas 
because of the additional energy required for conversion. . . . [T]he 
relative contribution of each fuel to emissions of carbon dioxide in the 
United States differs from its prevalence in energy consumption. Coal 
accounts for about one-third of U.S. emissions and natural gas for 
about one-fifth, although each accounts for about one-fourth of en-
ergy consumption from fossil fuels. . . . 
The United States is responsible for about one-fifth of the potential 
change in climate resulting from worldwide emissions of greenhouse 
gases from man-made carbon dioxide from fossil fuel combustion. 4 
Uncertainty surrounds the amount and effects of global warming; 
however, most in the scientific community agree that burning fossil 
fuels contributes to global warming to a greater extent than any 
other single cause. To attack this environmental threat effectively, it 
would behoove policy makers to target those factors that contribute 
most to the problem. Moreover, Congress should use those policy 
mechanisms that would accomplish the desired goals at the least 
cost. 
4. FRANK G. SUSSMAN, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OmcE., ENERGY USE AND 
EMISSIONS OF CARBON DIOXIDE: FEDERAL SPENDING AND CREDIT PROGRAMS AND 
TAX POLICIES ch. 2 (1990), reprinted in TAX NOTES TODAY, Jan. 15, 1991, available in 
LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT file, Doc. 91-309 [hereinafter CBO: ENERGY UsE) (cita· 
tions omitted) (citing, among others, J. Hansen et al., Regional Greenhouse Climate 
Effects, in CLIMATE INSTITUTE, COPING WITH CLIMATE CHANGE 68-81 (1991)). 
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B. Choice of Tools 
Achieving these goals probably requires the use of a variety of 
policy options.5 Price-oriented or market-based mechanisms like 
energy taxes may not, by themselves, promote conservation or effi-
ciency improvements sufficient to achieve the desired reduction in 
carbon dioxide emissions. Market failures often exist: lack of infor-
mation about the availability of alternative energy sources; the ab-
sence of non-carbon alternative fuels in the short run; short-run 
limitations on the availability of more energy-efficient technology; 
and shortages of capital supporting installation or development of 
more efficient technology. Another problem is the possibility that 
demand for fuel is so highly elastic that the entire tax cost could not 
be passed on to the energy consumer. Market mechanisms may also 
fail because of policy-makers' unwillingness to set prices high 
enough to discourage demand sufficiently. A national strategy to 
combat greenhouse gas emissions should therefore have comple-
mentary components: pricing or economic policies through some 
kind of energy tax, governmental regulations mandating behavioral 
changes and promoting the development and adoption of new 
technologies. 
There are a number of federal price-oriented, nonregulatory pro-
grams in effect that discourage the use of fossil fuels and decrease 
the emissions of carbon dioxide resulting from combustion. 6 How-
ever, the aggregate effect of these programs remains relatively small 
and is offset by other programs that encourage fossil fuel use.7 
C. Scope of This Article 
This article will assume that instituting an energy tax would be 
wise policy and will focus on how that tax should be designed. The 
assumed purpose of such a tax system is to combat the threat of 
global warming. I will discuss various theories of energy taxation 
and specifically the carbon-tax approach to reducing carbon dioxide 
emissions. 8 I will then discuss some of the problems encountered in 
5. DEBORAH GORDON, STEERING A NEW COURSE: TRANsPORTATION, ENERGY, 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 191-92 (1991). 
6. See, e.g., David Kaufman, The Greenhouse Effect· Ai'Gi/able and Needed Laws and 
Treaties, UCLA J. ENVIL L. & PoL'Y 219, 228-30 (1991). 
7. See id. at 230 (describing current United States' efforts as ad hoc). 
8. With regard to international negotiations, bringing about consumer response to 
global environmental dangers such as the greenhouse effect is challenging. In this situa-
tion, there is a collective action problem because harm to the environment results from 
using shared resources like the atmosphere in an uncontrolled manner. No one country 
has the economic incentive to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, even though doing so 
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designing such a tax, outline the possibilities for design and where 
appropriate, recommend a certain strategy or approach. 
D. Propriety of Using the Tax System for Environmental Goals 
(or Anything Other Than Raising Revenue) 
To what extent is it permissible to use the tax code to engineer 
social behavior? Should the sole purpose of a tax system be revenue 
would yield significant benefits. From the perspective of any one nation, the expenses of 
reducing emissions may outweigh the expected return since, without agreement by 
other countries that they will follow suit, reductions in one country may be offset by 
increases in others. So, even though the world would benefit from reduced emissions, 
the collective action problem prevents that outcome. Incentives are necessary to help 
market participants overcome their individual rational apathies and to yield a socially 
efficient outcome. James Poterba, MIT Economist, Speech at Harvard Law School, 
International Tax Program (January 30, 1991). See Jack Fitzgerald, The Intergovern· 
mental Panel on Climate Change: Taking the First Step Towards a Global Response, 14 
S. ILL. U. LJ. 231 (1990) for background regarding the collective action problem. 
Developing international policy involves difficult negotiation problems. The process 
leading to international agreement in the context of reducing CFC emissions took 
roughly ten years and culminated in the Montreal Protocol. Implementation of an 
agreement also takes time. There is reason to believe that an international agreement to 
reduce carbon dioxide emissions could potentially require even more time because in· 
dustrial economies are currently more directly dependent on carbon-dioxide-producing 
activities than they ever were on the use of CFCs. See CoNGRESSIONAL BUDGET OF· 
FICE, CARBON CHARGES AS A REsPONSE TO GLOBAL WARMJNG: THE EFFECTS OF 
TAXING FossiL FUELS 62-63 (1990) [hereinafter CBO: CARBON CHARGES] (negotiat· 
ing international carbon charges should be more difficult than negotiating the Montreal 
Protocol). 
Yet it should be remembered that failing to take domestic action to reduce carbon 
dioxide emissions will harm the U.S. diplomatically since many countries have already 
begun unilateral emissions reductions (e.g., Japan, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Finland, the U.K., etc.). In fact, ministers from Germany, Denmark, and the Nether· 
lands, joined by Italy, Belgium and Luxembourg, have recommended to the European 
Community that the EC Commission propose formal carbon tax legislation. Bureau of 
Nat'l Affairs, International Taxes, Ministers Ask EC Commission to Make Formal E11· 
ergy Tax Proposal, DAILY TAX REPORT, DTR No. 241, Dec. 16, 1991, at G-3 [hereinaf-
ter International Taxes]. Although no consensus or specific design has emerged as of 
the writing of this article, many European Community environment and energy minis-
ters acknowledge the need to tax carbon dioxide emissions. The EC Commission plan 
(which has been outlined in an informal "communication" to national governments 
rather than as a formal legislative proposal) aims for a tax of ten dollars/barrel of oil by 
the year 2000. 
Because the U.S., which is responsible for substantial carbon dioxide emissions, is 
reluctant to enact a carbon tax, it is unlikely that the EC will seriously consider doing so 
for some time. /d. This unwillingness for any individual country or group of countries 
to act first illustrates the collective action problem described above. The earliest serious 
proposals for any international carbon tax will probably emerge in the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development to be held in June of 1992 in Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil. It will be at this time that foreign countries will begin to exert pressure 
on the U.S. to respond to global environmental concerns such as earbon dioxide 
emissions. 
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raising? Any tax system, even if enacted solely for the purpose of 
raising revenue, will promote some types of social behavior over 
others. Therefore, it is an empty exhortation to assert that no tax 
should be enacted if it affects social behavior. Because no tax sys-
tem is neutral, those systems we choose to adopt should be ones 
that promote beneficial activities. As long as the social benefits 
from the tax outweigh losses (both in terms of absolute efficiency 
and other social goals), the tax may be designed to promote social 
goals, 
Further, the implementation of a legal system that harnesses 
market incentives does not contradict notions of representative gov-
ernment, since the elected legislature carries out its representative 
function by choosing which social goals will be imported into a tax 
system. 
E. Economic Efficiency 
Taxing carbon-dioxide-emitting fuels entails various efficiency 
gains and losses. These should qe considered when determining 
whether or not, and to what extent, a tax on fossil fuels should be 
imposed. The imposition of a tax on fuel will introduce economic 
inefficiency since fuel and product markets have developed equilib-
rium prices and outputs in the absence of a broad energy tax. This 
is because the open market has developed prices without consider-
ing environmental costs. Hence, enacting a tax introduces con-
sumption and production distortions vis-a-vis a scenario without 
tax. As some energy inputs (and the products they yield) become 
more expensive relative to others, financial and human capital will 
have to shift from the declining highly energy-intensive industries to 
those that are less-energy intensive or to those which benefit directly 
from a carbon tax (e.g., solar technologies industries). These shifts 
in capital will not be inexpensive to achieve, but their costs should 
be viewed as one-time charges. !I "In the case of a carbon tax, those 
industries or energy users most dependent on fossil fuels, least able 
to switch to alternative energy sources, least able to produce lower 
energy product lines, or least able to reduce their overall use of en-
ergy will be hardest hurt."10 The government can partially offset 
these one-time costs by allocating some of the revenue from the tax 
to help fund the various transitions. Doing so would help combat 
the negative political ramifications that an energy tax would proba-
9. 136 CoNG. REc. E709, 711 (1990) [hereinafter Dower & Repetto] (statements of 
Roger Dower & Robert Repetto of the World Resources Institute). 
10. Id. at 711. 
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bly engender. Also, if a tax were phased-in over a number of years 
the shock to the economy would be mitigated.ll 
The argument that an energy tax would be inefficient stems from 
the fact that most taxes are, in fact, inefficient. They impose added 
costs on socially beneficial activities such as productivity (work) or 
savings.12 The losses resulting from reduction of work, of savings 
or of investment are typically greater than the gains that result from 
the tax (revenue for the government which is used in turn to run 
various social programs and regulatory systems).13 The excess of 
loss over gain is a dead-weight loss to society and indicates that 
taxes are inefficient in the economic, total social welfare sense.I4 
Taxes that increase the cost of socially beneficial activities are 
allocatively inefficient. However, a carbon tax actually increases al-
locative efficiency by taxing a negative externality. The extra cost 
imposed on burning fossil fuels internalizes social costs of pollution 
not otherwise reflected in current market prices.15 Using taxes to 
11. A phase-in allows industry and individual consumers to adjust their behavior to 
prepare for the additional costs that a tax would impose. It accomplishes this in two 
ways: first, energy users can spread the cost of adapting to the tax over a number of 
years rather than having to incur large expenses within a short period of time. For 
example, companies can buy more energy-efficient equipment over time as their old 
equipment wears out instead of having to pay to replace equipment immediately. Tax-
payers would not have to depend on the immediate availability of capital and of more 
efficient technology. Second, the phase-in, or deferral of full taxation, gives the energy 
consumer time to adopt new attitudes about conservation. Thus, a phase-in spreads out 
costs over time (effectively reducing the initial tax rates) and provides a period for ad-
justment of attitudes regarding conservation. Improved attitudes will increase conser-
vation and will allow the taxpayer to incur less total tax liability. 
12. Dower & Repetto, supra note 9, at 710. 
13. Id. 
14. "In its narrowest perspective 'social,' or 'deadweight,' costs are those incurred 
without an offsetting benefit to someone else. Economists often call systems that avoid 
such costs Pareto-efficient. ••• [But s]ucb a perspective can be criticized for failing to 
account for fairness and distributional concerns." Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: 
A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 CoLUM. L. REv. 527, 529 n.3 (1983). 
15. See 137 CoNG. R.Ec. H1109, 1110 (dally ed. Feb. 21, 199l)(statement of Rep. 
Stark); Dower & Repetto, supra note 9, at 710; GORDON, supra note 5, at 178; Tim 
Gray, White House Energy Plan Panned; Some Pain No Gain for Bush's Proposed Capi-
tal Gains Study, 50 TAX NoTES 813, 814 (199l)[hereinafter Gray, White 
House](quoting Lester Brown); J. Andrew Hoerner, Breath and Taxes: Air Pollution 
Taxes in the Works, 46 TAX NOTES 1356, 1357 (1990) [hereinafter Hoerner, Breath]; J. 
Andrew Hoerner, Climate Said to Be Wannfor Passage of Carbon Tax, 47 TAX NoTES 
1417 (1990) [hereinafter Hoerner, Climate]; J. Andrew Hoerner, Energy Taxes for Defi-
cit Reduction: The Shape of Things to Come, 48 TAX NoTES 1585, 1587 (1990) [herein-
after Hoerner, Energy Taxes for Deficit]; Alan S. Miller, Policy Responses to Global 
Wanning, 14 S. ILL U. L. J. 187, 204 (1990); Elizabeth Corcoran & Paul Wallicb, 
Corban Levies: Tax on Fuels Containing Ccrbon-The Analytical Economist, 263 Scr. 
AM., Sept. 1990, at 171 ("Some economists argue that imposing a tax on environmen· 
tally damaging carbon just makes the price of fossil fuels more closely reflect their 'true' 
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discourage polluting activities, which generate economic losses 
through environmental degradation, can improve economic effi-
ciency. Pollution taxes and charges can help correct the well-
known failure of markets to refiect pollution damages fully in the 
costs and profit-loss calculations of the polluting firm or household. 
Shifting the tax base so that taxes fall less heavily on savings and 
work, and more heavily on environmentally damaging activities, pays 
double dividends in economic efficiency. Every dollar taken off the 
personal or business income tax pays a 15 to 45 percent dividend in 
increased economic welfare. If the tax loss is made good by a dollar 
levied on polluting activities, there is a further dividend in the form of 
reduced environmental damages and regulatory costs. [The economic 
value of reduced environmental damage must, of course, be estimated, 
but it encompasses the benefits of the reduced chance of global warm-
ing and all of its detrimental climatic effects, 16 reduced health costs, 17 
a decrease in lost work time, and the mitigation of the decrease in 
property values that may result from pollution.] ... [The benefits of] 
resource efficiency and environmental protection [should be] fully in-
tegrated into the decisions of producers and consumers throughout 
the economy.18 
A carbon tax is a market mechanism that would force private actors 
to take into account the social costs of polluting. A distinction ex-
ists between increasing deadweight loss through a tax, and cor-
recting a market failure to address non-market costs. The theory 
behind a carbon tax is that it would accomplish the latter task 
rather than be classified in the former category. 
The argument that the tax is imprudent because taxes are inher-
ently inefficient must also be evaluated by comparing the efficiency 
of alternative strategies. Once a government determines that it 
cost to society."); Red Ink. Green Taxes, EcoNOMisr, July 21, 1990, at 11; Poterb3, 
supra note 8. 
16. Broadly speaking, the detrimental environmental effects of global wnnning in-
clude: ''Rapidly changing climate patterns rather than the relntively st.nble climates of 
the past millennia; [n]ew and changing water resource regimes; [m]ore vulnerable and 
uncertain agricultural production systems; [s]maller and less numerous ecosystems; 
[r]ising sea levels; and [i]ncreased risk of large scale environmental losses from positive 
feedback effects." Dower & Repetto, supra note 9, at 711. 
17. "A study by the American Lung Association has determined that nearly one-half 
of all Texans - close to eight million people - are at risk from the air they breathe. A 
clean-burning fuel such as natural gas ••• would emit less [sic] pollutants [as compared 
to oil] and help clean the air [eliminating many of the long-term costs associated with 
providing health care for individuals affected by air pollution]." Lori M. Rodger.;, En-
e18J' Efficiency, Conservation, and Clean Air: An Ongoing Debate, Pus. U1ll.. FORT., 
Jan. 18, 1990, at 32. 
18. Dower & Repetto, supra note 9, at 710. 
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wants to reduce or stabilize carbon dioxide emissions (given ex-
pected benefits and costs), the choice of which strategy to pursue 
depends on their relative efficiencies. If a tax approach to global 
warming proves more efficient than alternative approaches, it 
should be implemented first. If additional measures need to be 
taken in order to reduce carbon dioxide emissions further, they 
should be implemented in order of decreasing efficiency until the 
ultimate goal is achieved.19 Bruce Ackerman provides a useful 
analogy illustrating why market approaches are generally preferable 
to command and control regulation. 
An analogy from a very different policy area may be instructive. Im-
agine that the Labor Department refused to report an Unemployment 
Rate each month. Instead, when it was asked about the employment 
situation, it inundated its audience with stories about how workers in 
one or another industry might be displaced by one or another technol-
ogy. While such stories are informative, wouldn't there be a great 
danger that the general public, and Congress, would miss the forest 
for the trees? The preeminent question, after all, that generalist deci-
sionmakers can and should answer is how much overall unemploy-
ment [or in this case, how much overall carbon dioxide emission or 
global warming] is tolerable. And for this purpose, the unemploy-
ment rate functions as a key control variable. The same holds true in 
environmental policy; a vote on a proposal to change the overall 
[baseline cost to impose on the overall amount of pollution] . . . 
would be a vehicle for the democratic formulation of policy superior 
to any generated by the existing BAT [Best Available control Tech-
nology] regulatory system.2o 
The Congressional Budget Office, echoing this sentiment, stated 
that "carbon charges would be more efficient than regulatory meas-
ures that would require the government to dictate to consumers or 
producers what amounts of fossil fuels they should use or what 
levels of carbon dioxide they should emit."2 1 
F. Alternative Goals 
The use of an energy tax to mitigate the greenhouse effect also 
promotes alternative national goals: national security, by reducing 
dependence on fossil fuel, much of which is imported from the Mid-
19. See Bruce Ackerman, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for 
Market Incentives, 13 CoLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171, 172-178 (1988) for a description of 
how current environmental command and control regulatory policies are highly ineffi· 
cient in achieving their goals. 
20. Id. at 190. 
21. CBO: CARBON CHARGES, supra note 8, at 15. 
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die East;22 the additional environmental benefit of reducing atmos-
pheric concentrations of carbon particulates, thereby improving air 
quality; and raising revenue.23 Revenue from an energy tax could 
be used for any number of purposes, including the reduction of the 
deficit, environmental protection or the provision of funds to deal 
with the transitional economic dislocations that would occur as a 
result of the tax.24 This fact increases the overall attractiveness of 
an energy-tax approach to fighting global warming. 
II. 
DESIGN 
A. Theories of Energy Taxation: Considerations in Determining 
How an Energy Tax Should Be Calculated 
There are three main theoretical bases for calculating an energy 
tax: the ad valorem method, the Btu tax and the carbon tax.25 The 
different varieties of tax accomplish different goals, so the choice of 
goals to be promoted should determine what type of tax should be 
adopted and how that tax should be designed and implemented. 
1. The Ad Valorem Method 
The first basis for calculating an energy tax is the ad valorem 
method. This method would impose a tax based on a percentage of 
a fuel's sales price. Such a tax would serve the goal of minimizing 
the percentage of GNP spent on energy, thereby promoting the use 
of capital for alternative purposes. This tax would promote na-
tional-security and trade-deficit goals by making coal (derived pri-
marily from domestic sources) more attractive than oil (most of 
which is imported) because coal costs much less per unit of energy 
output than does oil. Although total consumption of fuel would 
diminish, demand for fuels relative to each other would shift toward 
the cheapest and coincidentally the dirtiest fuels, primarily coal.26 
22. 137 CoNG. R.Ec. Hll09 (daily ed. Feb. 21, 1991); Hoerner, Energy Taxes for 
Deficit, supra note 15, at 1586; 136 CoNG. R.Ec. D854 (daily ed. July 11, 1990) (state-
ment of Felix G. Rohatyn, Senior Partner, Lazard Freres and Co., before the U.S. 
House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means). 
23. 136 CoNG. R.Ec. H2248, H2249 (daily ed. May 10, 1990) (statement of Rep. 
Stark). 
24. See generally, 136 CoNG. R.Ec. D854 (daily ed. July 11, 1990); Hoerner, Energy 
Taxes for Deficit, supra note 15, at 1586; Red Ink. Green Taxes, supra note 15, at 11; J. 
Andrew Hoerner, Future Bright but Hazy for Pollution Taxes, 41 TAX NOTES 12. 13 
(1990). 
25. See Hoerner, Energy Taxes for Deficit, supra note 15, at 1586. 
26. Jessica T. Mathews, Energy Tax Options, WASH. Posr, July 30, 1990, at All. 
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An ad valorem tax would also impose additional costs on clean 
forms of energy, such as solar and wind power,27 so it would not 
necessarily serve the environmental goal of reducing carbon dioxide 
emissions.28 According to Hoerner, this way of calculating an en-
ergy tax would be relatively easy to administer both because current 
accounting methods track values rather than volumes and because 
the taxing authorities are accustomed to tracking values reported as 
opposed to physical quantities of goods.29 Nevertheless, a tax sys-
tem could be designed that would track volumes rather than values 
offuel.3° 
In addition to the problems of promoting coal over oil and natu-
ral gas and in discouraging non-fossil energy sources, an ad valorem 
tax would double-tax energy that is produced from the combustion 
of other energy.31 For example, a fossil fuel used to produce elec-
tricity would be taxed at a percentage of its value. The electricity 
produced would also be taxable separately to consumers even 
though carbon dioxide has been emitted only once during the pro-
duction of the electricity. If the taxing authorities decide to impose 
an ad valorem tax at only one point in the energy production cycle 
to combat double-taxation, then they must determine the most equi-
table point at which to impose it for all the different fuels. Tite 
purpose is to avoid inequities when the tax is imposed at different 
points of the production cycle or marketing channel for different 
fuels (e.g., coal taxed at the mine mouth and natural gas taxed at 
the point of sale to the final customer). 32 Because an ad valorem tax 
is based on cost, rather than on actual carbon content, "transporta-
tion and distribution costs of [natural] gas, but not of coal, would be 
subject to the ad valorem rate"33 in the example provided. 
Although coal would be taxed correctly, natural gas would be ex-
cessively taxed. 
The ad valorem method would exacerbate any existing regional 
Throughout this paper the term "clean fuels" will refer to those fuels with a carbon 
content that is low relative to that of other fuels (e.g., natural gas) or to energy sources 
with no carbon content (e.g., solar, wind, or geothermal power). The term "dirty fuels" 
will be used to refer to those fuels with a carbon content that is high relative to that of 
--other fuels (e.g., coal or oil). 
27. Id. 
28. Hoerner, Energy Taxes for Deficit, supra note 15, at 1586-87. 
29. Id. at 1587. 
30. See generally section on Carbon Burned Tax, Sections ll.C.l.b (1) and (2) infra, 
for how such tracking could be accomplished. 
31. Hoerner, Energy Taxes for Deficit, supra note 15, at 1589. 
32. Id. . 
33. Id. 
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or industrial inequities in fuel bills. For example, consumers of 
electricity pay very different prices depending on where they Iive.34 
Those who pay more for one unit of electricity before the tax will 
also pay a larger tax since the tax would be calculated as a percent-
age of sales price rather than of pollution emitted. 
2. The Btu Tax 
The Btu (British thermal unit) tax provides another option for 
calculating an energy tax. Taxes imposed would be "based on the 
physical amount of heat [that] the energy source supplies. " 3S Tax-
ing energy in this way does not directly serve any energy tax goal. 
Btus simply function as one measure of energy use. Since one must 
bum much more coal than natural gas to obtain a given useful Btu 
output, coal (emitting more carbon dioxide per Btu produced than 
does natural gas) would be undertaxed relative to natural gas under 
this method. Since energy dissipates at every stage of energy trans-
mission, determining the proper point in the production process to 
impose a Btu tax creates problems.J6 As the energy gets closer and 
closer to the end-user, the number of Btus available for use de-
creases. Thus, given a constant tax rate on Btus, the amount of tax 
actually payable decreases the further along in the production pro-
cess the tax is imposed. Of course, rates could be adjusted upward 
as the imposition of the tax moves closer to the final user. Deter-
mining the correct rate adjustments, however, would create admin-
istrative difficulties because the size of the adjustment would depend 
on energy conversion efficiency. The more efficiently energy is con-
verted, the smaller the upward adjustment in the tax rate should be. 
In the ad valorem situation, the tax rate would be adjusted down-
ward as the imposition of the tax moves closer to the final user. The 
amount of the adjustment would depend on the expenses incurred 
by (and the profit margin of) fuel producers.37 
In addition to this problem, taxing energy on the basis of total 
Btus produced provides no incentive to develop technology that 
would allow for more efficient fossil fuel combustion. Under the 
Btu tax, the more heat one could extract per unit of fuel, the greater 
34. See generally Mathews, supra note 26. 
35. Hoerner, Energy Taxes for Defidt, supra note 15, at 1586. 
36. Id. at 1589. 
37. Under an ad valorem tax, the rate should be adjusted downward as the energy 
source moves closer and closer to the end-user because the underlying price on which 
the tax is payable increases. Under a Btu tax, one should increase the rate as the energy 
moves closer to the final-user because the number of Btus on which the tax is payable 
decreases. 
HeinOnline -- 10 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 232 1991-1992
232 JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 10:221 
the amount of tax that would be incurred. Essentially, the energy 
user would be penalized for improving energy efficiency. 
Enforcement of a Btu tax would also entail the difficulty of verify-
ing a fuel's Btu content, especially once the fuel has been con-
sumed.38 Hence, there would be a great incentive for taxpayers to 
commit fraud by misreporting their fuel's quality. 
3. The Carbon Tax 
The carbon tax provides a third method for taxing energy. Under 
a carbon tax, governm.ent would impose taxes "based on the carbon 
content of fuels and their contribution to the problem of global 
warming."39 By placing a disincentive on dirty fuel consumption, a 
carbon tax should generate "energy conservation [and prompt] the 
substitution of fuels that produce less carbon dioxide for [those] 
that produce more."40 Since a carbon tax would be applied to fuels 
based on their carbon content, it would affect primarily the three 
main fossil fuels: coal, oil, and natural gas. The tax would not im-
pose additional costs on non-polluting energy sources such as solar 
or wind power. Since a carbon tax grows in proportion to the car-
bon content of various fuels, this form of tax should prove the most 
effective in reducing carbon dioxide emissions and in improving al-
locational efficiency. Per unit of energy produced, burning coal 
emits seventy-five percent more carbon dioxide than burning natu-
ral gas and twenty-two percent more than burning oil.41 Under a 
carbon tax, coal would be taxed most heavily, followed by oil and 
natural gas. By discouraging coal consumption the carbon tax 
would also reduce emissions of sulfur and nitrogen oxides-other 
pollutants released by the combustion of coal.42 As a result, a car-
bon tax would promote several environmental goals. 
The carbon tax would not be vulnerable to the problem that 
arises under the ad valorem system of double taxing energy. While 
the carbon fuel used to produce electricity would be taxed, no sec-
ond tax would be imposed on the sale of electricity because the elec-
tricity itself contains no carbon. Additionally, the carbon tax 
avoids the problem, inherent in both the Btu and the ad valorem 
methods, that the amount or rate of tax should depend on when in 
the production cycle it is imposed. Under the Btu method, the 
38. Hoerner, Energy Taxes for Drificit, supra note 15, at 1587, 1589. 
39. Id. at 1586. 
40. Id. at 1587. 
41. Id. at 1586. 
42. See Mathews, supra note 26. 
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longer one waits to tax the energy, the fewer Btus remain to be 
taxed. Under the ad valorem tax, the longer one waits to tax the 
energy before it gets to the end-user, the greater the sale price of the 
fuel (since other costly inputs and mark-ups have driven up the 
price) and the greater the tax imposed. The amount of carbon sub-
ject to tax does not change as a fuel moves through the production 
cycle. Therefore, by basing the tax calculation on the carbon con-
tent of the fuel burned, no shifts in the taxable base will result as the 
fuel moves through the production cycle, from the point of extrac-
tion through the point of combustion.43 
The fact that a carbon tax calibrates the cost of energy sources 
with their carbon dioxide emissions does not mean that the carbon 
tax addresses all energy-related goals or that no design issues are 
raised. A carbon tax would make large domestic sources of fuel 
(e.g., coal) prohibitively expensive. It would also encourage further 
development and exploitation of nuclear power. To the extent that 
domestic fuel sources are not economically exploitable, we would 
increase our relative dependence on imported energy in the short 
run.44 The carbon tax presents another complication because under 
its rationale a credit for reforestation would be justified, since trees 
act as sinks absorbing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and 
preventing those absorbed emissions from contributing to the green-
house effect. 45 ~otential for taxpayer abuse of such a credit exists 
and raises its own enforcement issues.46 A carbon tax, rather than 
an ad valorem or Btu tax, would best serve the environment since it 
most accurately calibrates the price of each fossil fuel to that fuel's 
contribution to carbon dioxide emissions, and thus to global 
warming. 
B. Broad Versus Narrow Tax Base 
Economists agree that broad-based taxes are more economically 
efficient than those imposed on a narrowly targeted group or activ-
ity.47 Broad-based taxes create smaller deadweight losses than nar-
43. Hoerner, Energy Taxes for Deficit, supra note 15, at 1588·89. 
44. Id. at 1587. 
45. Id. at 1589. 
46. For instance, if ta.7; breaks are given for tree planting, and the calculation of the 
credit or deduction assumes normal tree lives (and, hence, assumes that each tree will 
absorb carbon dioxide for many years), it would be relatively easy to get a greater sub-
sidy than is deserved by planting and destroying trees over and over again on one small 
parcel of land. Poterba, supra note 8. Other specific design issues that arise under the 
carbon tax will be addressed in Part II of this article. 
47. See J. Andrew Hoerner, Energy Taxes Would Hurt Chemical Industry, Dow Olfi-
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row-based taxes.48 Furthermore, when the government taxes a 
large pool of entities, each taxpayer's individual burden can be re-
duced while the government maintains a given level of revenue. 
Thus, the broader the tax base, the more money the government can 
raise at any given rate of tax. 49 Therefore, if the government estab-
lishes a carbon tax, the tax should have as broad a base as possible. 
Narrowly based energy taxes may be ineffective. The gas-guzzler 
tax provides an example. According to the American International 
Automobile Dealer's Association, cars "account for ('only') 16% of 
all domestic carbon dioxide production."50 Hence, legislation that 
taxes only inefficient cars will not reduce total carbon dioxide emis-
sions by any significant amount. Designing the tax to be broad-
based would serve both environmental and revenue goals since both 
travel and transportation (as in a narrow gas tax), as well as all 
other combustion of carbon energy would be taxed. 
An oil excise tax, another narrow energy tax, also illustrates the 
ineffectiveness of narrowly based taxes in reducing carbon dioxide 
emissions. By making oil more expensive compared to dirtier fuels 
such as coal, an oil tax promotes the use of the dirtier fuels and 
would encourage higher carbon dioxide emissions.51 
The broader the energy tax base, the less likely the energy tax is 
to single out any one industry, region, or economic class dispropor-
tionately. For example, a tax applied narrowly only to oil would 
hurt oil-producing regions of the country while coal-producing re-
gions would not bear any of the burden. Also, a narrow gas tax hits 
the poorest individuals hardest,52 since the fixed amount of tax 
would constitute a larger portion of a poor individual's income. A 
broad-based energy tax would mitigate this inequitable regressivity 
somewhat: the wealthy consume more "intermediate energy" from 
manufactured goods (coal, oil and natural gas), a greater share of 
electricity (primarily coal) and a greater portion of travel-related 
aviation energy (oil) than do the poor.53 Hence, choosing a broad 
cia/ Charges, 50 TAX NOTES 1215 (1991), [hereinafter Hoerner, Energy Taxes Would 
Hurt]; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, REDUCING THE DEFICIT: SPENDING AND REVENUE 
OPTIONS: A REPORT TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE CoMMI'ITEES ON THE BUDGET-
PART II 427 (1990) [hereinafter CBO: REDUCING THE DEFICIT); Red Ink, Green 
Taxes, supra note 15, at 11. 
48. Hoerner, Energy Taxes Would Hurt, supra note 47. 
49. Red Ink, Green Taxes, supra note 15, at 11. 
50. Hoerner, Breath, supra note 15, at 1359. 
51. Red Ink, Green Taxes, supra note 15, at 11. 
52. Hoerner, Energy Taxes for Deficit, supra note 15, at 1589. 
53. Red Ink, Green Taxes, supra note 15, at 11. 
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base that taxes coal, oil (mcluding gasoline) and natural gas rather 
than only gasoline would mitigate regressivity. 54 A carbon tax 
presents the most theoretically sound form of energy tax. It is 
broader-based than a variety of specific energy taxes. Because it is 
broader-based, it can raise more revenue at lower per-unit rates, and 
is more efficient. 55 
The carbon tax is not the broadest energy tax. It would not tax 
those energy sources which contain no carbon, such as nuclear, so-
lar, and wind power. The Btu tax, for example, which applies a tax 
based on the heat output of a given energy source, would include 
these other energy sources in the tax base.56 However, given the 
goal of preventing the greenhouse effect, taxation of non-polluting 
energy sources such as solar power does not make sense: a carbon 
tax would be superior.57 Of course, promoting nuclear power by 
not taxing it presents other significant dangers to the environment, 
but inhibiting carbon production alone is the most direct way to 
respond to the threat of global warming. 
An ad valorem tax may be broader than a carbon tax depending 
on which energy sources it would cover. If the ad valorem tax were 
applied only to gasoline (as is the usual case), then it would be 
much narrower than a carbon tax, which theoretically applies to all 
sources of fuel that emit carbon dioxide upon combustion. If the ad 
valorem tax were applied to all carbon fuels, however, and to solar 
and hydro-power as well, then it would be broader than the carbon 
tax. As mentioned above, however, taxing non-polluting energy 
sources like solar power would not further environmental policy. 
C. Problems Encountered in and Approaches for Designing and 
Implementing a Carbon Tax 
Implementing a carbon tax to achieve its goals of reducing car-
bon dioxide emissions and raising revenue requires consideration of 
certain practical problems. For instance, measuring carbon dioxide 
emissions directly is virtually impossible. 58 This problem causes 
54. See id.; Hoerner, Energy Taxes for Deficit, supra note 15, at 1589. 
55. See discussion of testimony by Helen 0. Petrauskas of Ford Motor Company and 
of Marina Whitman of General Motors in 136 CoNG. R.Ec. H2248, 2249 (1990)(state-
ment of Rep. Stark); Hoerner, Breath, supra note 15, at 1359 {position of American 
International Automobile Dealers Association). 
56. Hoerner, Energy Taxes Would Hurt, supra note 47, at 1215. 
51. Hoerner, Energy Taxes for Deficit, supra note 15, at 1586-87. 
58. Hoerner, Breath, supra note 15 at 1357-58 (discussing analogous area of taxing 
emissions of sulphur oxides and nitrogen oxides). Under current environmental regula-
tions, devices that measure emissions of these chemicals are already attached to some 
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many difficulties in designing and implementing the tax. As a con-
sequence, the administrative burden increases. As a substitute for 
measuring emissions directly, tax administrators should focus on 
measuring the volume and carbon content of fossil fuels burned. 
Fuel volume and grade can be verified much more easily than can 
carbon dioxide emissions directly. Yet verification of fuel volume, 
type, and grade poses its own administrative problems.59 
Virtually all sectors of our post-industrial economy contribute to 
carbon dioxide emissions through their prolific use of fossil fuels. 
Some industries, nevertheless, account for a substantial percentage 
of carbon dioxide emissions because they bum disproportionately 
large amounts of fossil fuels. The utility industry and the transpor-
tation sector of the economy fall into this category. The electric 
utility sector accounts for eighty percent of total U.S. coal con-
sumption.60 Therefore, "[t]he response of electric utilities is critical 
to the effects of carbon charge policies since coal emits more carbon 
than other fossil fuels."61 "Over 60% of petroleum products are 
consumed in transportation, including gasoline and diesel fuels for 
[cars], trucks and railroad locomotives, and jet fuel for aviation."62 
Therefore, the tax must be designed in such a way as to dampen 
consumption of electricity and transportation sufficiently and to 
promote the use of cleaner fuels in these sectors. 63 Because of their 
large relative contributions to carbon dioxide emissions, examples 
from these two sectors will be used illustratively throughout this 
article. Where examples from other industries are more appropriate 
to illustrate a point, they will be used instead. 
1.. On Whom Should the Tax Be Imposed? 
In designing a carbon tax it is necessary to determine on whom 
the tax should be imposed. There are a number of possible entities 
on which the tax could be levied. 
emissions sources, i.e., smokestacks. No such devices for measuring carbon dioxide 
emissions are set up in all locations where fossil fuels are burned, however. (E.g., 
automobiles.) 
59. Hoerner, Energy Taxes for Deficit, supra note 15, at 1587. 
60. CBO: CARBON CHARGES, supra note 8, at 28. 
61. Id. at 29. 
62. Id. at 30. 
63. The Congressional Budget Office obtained or derived all of its figures from U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP'T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK (1989). 
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a. Impose the Tax on One Entity 
(1) Impose the Tax at the Dock, the Mine-Mouth or the Well-
Head 
One could tax the company that first introduces the fuel into the 
economy: the firm that extracts the natural resource and turns it 
into usable fuel or the company that imports the fuel into the do-
mestic economy.64 Imposing the tax at its initial entry point into 
the economy ensures a broad tax base. Imposing the tax at the be-
ginning of the production process also helps prevent the situation 
where some fuel escapes taxation.65 And it prevents double-taxa-
tion of some uses of fuel. 66 
When the government imposes a tax on the entity that introduces 
the carbon fuel into the economy, that entity will raise its prices. 
"Since the use of fossil fuels is pervasive in the U.S. economy, the 
changes in fuel prices caused by carbon charges would affect the 
prices of virtually all intermediate and final goods."67 The price 
increase will filter through the economy,68 making carbon-intensive 
64. Taxing the fuel at this point is commonly referred to ns imposing the tax at the 
dock, the mine-mouth, or the well-head. 
65. For example, where a gasoline retailer is the entity on whom the tax is imposed, 
fuel would escape taxation to the extent of any sales directly from wholesaler to 
consumer. 
66. Suppose burners of coal are the entities on whom the tax would be imposed. Any 
coal that utilities bought from sources other than original extractors, which are also 
presumed burners, would have already been taxed when that seller bought it (because of 
the seller's status as a presumed burner). The coal would be taxed again when the 
utility company purchased it, since the utility is also presumed to be a burner. To avoid 
this double taxation, one must either impose the tax only at the fuel's entry point into 
the stream of commerce or establish a system whereby resale of the coal will trigger a 
credit for the seller. (See CBT discussed infra section II.C.l.b.) 
67. CBO: CARBON CHARGES, supra note 8, at 11. 
68. Prices will increase to some extent but probably not enough to account for the 
entire amount of tax incurred. This results because producers may not be able to pass 
on their entire cost increase to consumers. Their ability to pass on increased costs to 
consumers depends on the elasticity of demand of the good being sold. When demand is 
highly elastic (because of the availability of substitute goods, for example}, many con-
sumers will stop purchasing the good following a price increase. They will instead 
purchase substitute goods or reduce consumption altogether in favor of saving. 
To maintain a sufficient sales volume, the seller must keep the price of the gaoo low. 
Therefore, any additional costs which the seller incurs, he will have to bear. When 
demand is inelastic, on the other hsnd, the producer can raise prices, and consumers 
(who still need that good) will willingly pay the increased price in order to obtain the 
product. In this case the consumer bears the tax burden because prices will increase to 
reflect the additional tax costs. To the extent that demand for goods produced with 
fossil fuels is inelastic, the tax imposed on fuel at the beginning of the production pro-
cess will filter through to ultimate consumers in the form of increased prices. As long ns 
demand is not completely inelastic, consumption patterns will shift to some extent, and 
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energy more expensive and thus discouraging its use. The increase 
in the price of carbon fuels will also make goods produced with 
carbon-intensive energy more expensive than other goods. The 
higher prices of the "polluting" goods will discourage their con-
sumption. 69 One problem with imposing a carbon tax at the mine-
mouth, the well-head or the dock is that in some industries, such as 
independent oil and gas production, the market structure of the 
chain of production is such that the tax would be imposed on a 
party that could not pass the additional cost on to its buyer. This 
would happen where the taxed party is a price taker.1o A price 
taker either lacks the negotiation power to demand a higher price 
for its goods or sells goods with highly elastic demand. In either 
case, by raising its prices, the price taker loses all its business. In 
such a case, the price increase would not be passed on to the con-
sumer. The inability to pass the additional cost on through the vari-
ous production levels to the ultimate consumer would prevent the 
desired shift in consumer demand away from energy-intensive 
goods.71 Each energy industry must be examined now and over 
producers will use cleaner fuels and attempt to be more fuel efficient in order to recnJ>· 
ture a market for their goods. 
Even if demand for a good were elastic, some energy efficiency may be encouraged by 
imposing a carbon tax at the beginning of the production process. Forcing producers to 
bear a portion or all of the tax encourages them to improve energy efficiency and to use 
cleaner fuels through their desire to improve profitability. Elasticities of demand for 
raw materials vary at different points of the production process and over time as techno-
logical advances make clean substitute energy sources available. See Martin Lobel, Re-
funding Unconstitutional State Taxes, 52 TAX NOTES 584 (1991). See generally 
DOUGLAS R. BOHI, ANALYZING DEMAND BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF ENERGY ELASTJC· 
mES (1981); RobertS. Pindyck, The Characteristics of the Demand for Energy in EN· 
ERGY CoNSERVATION AND PUBUC POLICY 22 (J.C. Sawhill ed., 1979). For an 
example from William Roberts of the Environmental Defense Fund, see Hoerner, 
Breath, supra note 15, at 1359. Because of these complications, determining the ulti-
mate incidence of a carbon tax with certainty is very difficult. 
69. The difficulty in determining precisely how much of the tax each participant in 
the economy would bear should be noted. For example, a tax of $100 per ton of carbon 
dioxide emissions would increase the price of oil or natural gas at the well-head by 
about fifty percent, but it is estimated that only half of this price increase would ulti-
mately reach the-retail consumer. CBO: CARBON CHARGES, supra note 8, at 21. Thus, 
the fact that the carbon tax is imposed on only one entity in the production line does not 
mean that entity will be discouraged more than others in the line from using fossil fuels. 
The ultimate incidence of a carbon tax may be affected only a little bit by choice of what 
entity should remit payment of the tax. 
If the incidence of a carbon tax results in a tax-exempt entity bearing some portion of 
the tax, that entity should not receive a refund for the amount of tax borne. Tax-ex· 
empt entities should, like others, have a responsibility to make consumption decisions 
that further environmental goals. 
70. See Hoerner, Energy Taxes for Deficit, supra note 15, at 1587. 
71. See generally supra note 68. 
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time to ensure that the government imposes the tax against the ear-
liest owner that can successfully pass on the additional cost. 
(2) Impose the Tax Later in the Production Process 
As an alternative to taxing the entity that first brings the carbon 
fuel into the stream of commerce, the tax could be imposed at a 
later stage of production. The tax could be imposed on an entity 
that owns either the fuel or the goods produced by burning the fuel. 
The tax would be imposed on the middle- or end-user of the fossil 
fuel (i.e., either the producers of products that require fossil-fuel 
combustion for their manufacture or the ultimate consumers of 
those products). The rationale behind making a carbon tax payable 
by a middle- or end-user is that not all of the tax can be absorbed in 
the form of price increases when imposed at the mine-mouth, well-
head or dock. When demand for a fuel is inelastic, the entity that 
first introduces it into the stream of commerce can pass increases in 
price on to purchasers. This allows the price increase caused by the 
tax to filter through all stages of production and to affect ultimate 
consumers' purchasing decisions, making energy-intensive products 
more expensive than those not requiring much energy input. When 
demand for an energy source is elastic, however, the entity which 
first introduces the fuel into the production process must absorb 
some portion of the tax to avoid reduced demand for the fuel. It 
cannot shift to purchasers the entire amount of the tax in the form 
of a price increase. This means that the fuel producer or importer 
may pay for environmental damage even though it does not actually 
bum the fuel. The ultimate burner or consumer of the fuel may 
bear only a portion of the tax and, hence, remain underdeterred 
from burning or consuming fuel (or from consuming goods whose 
manufacture requires the combustion of dirty fuels). 
For revenue purposes, it does not matter whether energy consum-
ers or those entities which extract or import the fuel bear the taxes. 
From an environmental perspective, however, conservation goals 
could be best promoted if the tax were borne by that entity which 
could decide whether or not to consume the energy or the energy-
intensive good: the middle- or end-user. For this reason, it may 
make sense to design the tax to be imposed directly on the energy 
user (the producer or ultimate consumer of goods). 
Imposing the tax late in the production cycle entails costs. It 
would be necessary to identify all the fuel users in order to maintain 
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a broad tax base. 72 If many were missed, the resulting tax would 
necessarily have a narrower base than if it had been imposed at tile 
beginning of the production cycle. It is also likely that there would 
be more taxable entities if the tax were imposed on middle- or end-
users than if it were imposed on extractors and importers offuel.73 
The greater number of potential taxpayers significantly complicates 
the administration and enforcement of the tax.74 This complication 
provides another reason for imposing the tax when the fuel enters 
the economy rather than on middle- or end-users. A third problem 
with imposing the tax late in the production process occurs when 
the tax is imposed after non-fuel goods are produced by burning 
fossil fuel. The difficulty inherent in verifying what the fuel's car-
bon content had been prior to combustion would hamper enforce-
ment of the tax. 
b. Impose the Tax on More Than One Entity: The Carbon-
Burned TaX (CBT) 
The two choices described above concerning whom to tax both 
provide for the taxation of only one entity along the production pro-
cess. The value-added tax (VAT) provides some useful concepts for 
determining an alternative scheme for how to design a carbon tax. 
Instead of imposing a carbon tax on only one entity along the chain 
of production, it is possible to employ a method analogous to the 
VAT subtraction method. Both sales and use of fuel wo1:Jld be 
tracked throughout the production process. Under this method the 
government could impose the tax on more than one entity per use of 
fuel. Each and every entity that burned any carbon fuel would be 
responsible for paying the carbon tax no matter where along the 
production process they are located. An appropriate name for such 
72. See Charles Komanoff, Instead of a Gas Tax, How About a Carbon Tax?, WASH. 
PoST, Mar. 6, 1989, at A15. Komanoff suggests that if all of the following end-users 
were taxed, a relatively broad tax base could be maintained: gasoline consumers; elec-
tricity users; industry, office and home users of natural gas; truck and jet fuel users; 
petrochemical companies; home users of heating oil; and steel producers which con-
sume coal. 
73. But see Hoerner, Energy Taxes for Deficit, supra note 15, at 1588. Taxing natuml 
gas at the well-head is difficult because currently that industry includes a large number 
of small producers at the well-head stage of production. Still, the number of producers 
compared to the number of middle or final users of fuel may be small. 
74. See CBO: REDUCING THE DEFICIT, supra note 47, at 428. To avoid evasion 
problems, the best administrative alternative is to impose the tax at the stage in which 
the fewest entities would be taxed. The report suggests that in the fossil fuel industries, 
fewer entities would be taxable at the stage where fuel enters the stream of commerce 
than at the ultimate retail level. 
HeinOnline -- 10 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 241 1991-1992
1992] CARBON TAX 241 
a tax is the "Carbon-Burned Tax" (CBT). Each taxpayer is taxed 
on the fuel its bums. 
A CBTwould work similarly to a VAT by taxing entities at each 
level of production. It would differ from a VAT in that it would be 
based on volume of fuel burned rather than on value added from 
fuel ~e. It would also differ from a VAT in that each entity would 
be taxed on volume of fuel purchases less volume of fuel sales, 
rather than value of sales less value of purchases of goods. 
The rationale for taxing carbon fuels in this fashion would be 
that, under a CBT, the charge for emitting carbon dioxide into the 
atmosphere would be imposed directly on the entity that actually 
bums the carbon fuel and in proportion to the amount of carbon 
dioxide that party releases. The tax is paid by the burner of the 
fuel, the party who, over the short-run and to a greater extent over 
the long-run, has the power to decide: (1) what kind of fuel to use (a 
dirty fuel that contributes greatly to carbon dioxide emissions or a 
clean fuel); and (2) whether or not to implement energy-efficient 
equipment or equipment which can substitute clean for dirty fuels. 
By taxing all fossil-fuel consumption, a CBT remains broad-based, 
yet by taxing many entities along the production process, the ulti-
mate consumer may bear a greater share of the tax than in the case 
of a tax imposed only at the mine-mouth, the well-head or the 
dock.75 Therefore, demand for energy-intensive goods would drop 
and demand for energy-thrifty goods would increase. Thus, a CBT 
offers the advantages of being relatively broad-based and of being 
able to change the relative consumer prices of goods and fuel, which 
would in tum lead to environmentally sound shifts in consumption 
decisions. 
(1) Functioning of the CBT 
For a clarification of how a CBT would work, consider the fol-
lowing examples. In the utility context, the utility company could 
buy carbon fuel from any source. Since the fuel has not yet been 
burned, it will not yet have been taxed.76 Upon purchase of the 
fuel, the utility company would incur a carbon tax based on the 
carbon content and volume of fuel purchased. The utility company 
would then bum the fuel to generate electricity for resale. When 
the utility sells electricity to consumers, it would not receive any 
75. The ultimate incidence of the tax may or may not be shifted. See supra notes 68 
and 69. 
76. Actually, the seller of this fuel would be taxed when it got possession of the fuel, 
but it would receive an offsetting credit when it resells the fuel. 
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credit offsetting its tax liability because the energy it resells does not 
contain any carbon. The consumption of electricity would not, in 
itself, trigger any carbon dioxide emissions. 
Since utilities are regulated, it should be easy to impose the tax on 
them and to collect it. They should be permitted to increase their 
rates to some extent to shift the tax burden to consumers so that 
electricity consumption would drop accordingly. This reduced 
electrical output would permit utilities to decrease the quantities of 
fossil fuels they burn. Hence, carbon dioxide emissions would de-
crease accordingly. 
Utilities would also pe encouraged to substitute cleaner fuels for 
coal. Since a carbon tax would tax coal more heavily than any 
other energy source, the price increase of electricity to consumers 
would be greatest for coal-burning utilities. Consumers of electric-
ity produced with coal will cut electricity consumption by a rela-
tively greater amount than would consumers who use electricity 
generated with cleaner fuels. Thus, coal consumption would drop 
more than would consumption of those cleaner fuels: a desirable 
result from an environmental perspective. 
To the extent the utility is not allowed to shift the entire tax to 
consumers, the utility company, too, will have an incentive to mod-
ify its behavior. Over time it will install new equipment permitting 
it to use cleaner fuels and to improve efficiency in generating 
electricity. 77 
In the transportation context, a CBT would have similar pro-en-
vironment effects. The transporter of goods or people would incur 
tax liability upon purchasing carbon fuel.78 The transporter then 
burns the fuel in transporting the goods or people. Since the trans-
porter cannot resell the fuel once burned, no offsetting credit for 
that fuel would ever be received. The transportation company 
would be liable to the government for the tax on the volume and 
carbon content of the fuel used. 
The transporter should then increase prices to pass on to custom-
ers the added cost of the tax. For example, orange sellers' shipping 
costs would increase, and oranges should become more expensive as 
a result. Once the prices of transported goods and of train or air-
plane tickets increase, the ultimate consumers of these goods and 
services will shift consumption away from those whose prices have 
77. See generally Matthew L. Wald, Utilities Given a Warning, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 
1991, at D3. 
78. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
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increased the most to those whose prices have not increased or have 
risen less. Decreased consumption means a decrease in carbon di-
oxide emissions. Also, decreased demand for their products will en-
courage transporters who use dirty fuels to substitute cleaner fuels 
to improve fuel efficiency. The result should be reduced carbon di-
oxide emissions and increased achievement of environmental goals. 
(2) Enforcement of the CBT 
Under the CBT, enforcement could be accomplished through the 
implementation of additional reporting requirements. Companies 
would have to report to the government the volume of any fuel 
purchases and sales. The excess of volume purchased over volume 
sold would represent each entity's fuel consumption. Some of that 
fuel was burned and thus emitted carbon dioxide into the atmos-
phere. Some of that fuel may have been used as a feedstock. 79 
In implementing a CBT, it would be necessary to verify quantities 
of fuel purchased and sold80 to counter taxpayer incentives to un-
derreport fuel purchased and to overreport fuel resales. As an aid 
to verification, all taxpayers should be required to report their 
purchases and sales of carbon fuels. Sellers would have to report to 
the government the identity of the entity that purchased fuel from 
them (providing the taxpayer identification number of the pur-
chaser), the type of fuel sold and the quantity. Purchasers would 
have to report what types and what quantities of fuel they have 
79. Using fuel as a feedstock does not require its combustion. The fuel is simply used 
as an ingredient in a product. Since fuel is not burned, carbon dioxide is not released 
into the atmosphere. Therefore, under the theoretical rationale for the carbon tax, it 
does not make sense to tax the feedstock use of carbon fuels. See Hoerner, Energy 
Taxes Would Hurt, supra note 47, at 1215. If, however, policy makers were more con-
cerned with resource conservation than carbon dioxide emissions, taxation of fuels used 
as feedstocks would be proper. The use of carbon fuels as feedstocks is com.mon in a 
number of industries including chemicals, steel, and plnstics. For discussion of carbon 
use in the chemical industry, see id.; Treasury Tax Correspondence, Dow Chemical Op-
poses Proposed Fossil Fuel Tax as Anti-Competitive, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 10, 1990, 
available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT file; CBO: CARBoN CHARGES, supra note 8, 
at 18. For discussion of carbon use in the steel industry, see Daniel F. Cuff, Unlon 
Carbide Recasts Itself, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 10, 1984, at D1; LTV Corporation Opposes 
Carbon Tax, Btu Tax, and Virgin Matenals Tax, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 12, 1990, 
available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT file. For a discussion of carbon use in the 
plastics industry, see telephone interview with Pat Toner, Society of Plastics Industry, 
Jan. 10, 1992 (asserting that as much as half of the Btu input of energy used in the 
plastics industry is used as feedstock rather than combusted); CBO: CA.lU!ON CHARGES, 
supra note 8, at 18. The design implications of using fuel as feedstocks are discussed 
infra section ILC.2. 
SO. Verification of the amount of fuel that producers use as a feedstock will be ad-
dressed infra section II.C.2. 
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bought and the taxpayer identification numbers of their fuel suppli-
ers. For imported fuel, obtaining an import license could be made 
conditional on the foreign entity disclosing similar information. 
Verification of any fuel exports might be required by export authori-
ties to ensure that the quantity and fuel type have not been 
misrepresented. 
Through this dual reporting requirement, the government would 
be able to cross-check buyers' purchases against sellers' sales. In 
this way the reporting system could ensure that no individual fuel 
user underreports the volume of fuel purchased or overreports the 
volume of fuel sold. For transactions that do not match, the gov-
ernment could audit the two entities involved. 
The system of cross-checking eliminates taxpayer incentive to 
misreport volumes of fuel purchased or resold. Purchasers will not 
be able to underreport the volume of carbon fuel that they have 
purchased because to do so would require the seller to underreport 
the amount of fuel sold. The seller, however, will not do this, be-
cause to do so would increase its tax burden. 81 The seller's incen-
tive to overestimate the quantity of fuel it resells is counterbalanced 
by the buyer's interest in monitoring the seller to make sure the 
buyer's purchases are not overestimated. Seller overestimation of 
sales remains a problem only in those ins4U1ces in which the buyer 
cannot effectively monitor the seller to ensure that the buyer re-
ceives the correct amount of fuel. 82 
81. Only when the seller and purchaser are subject to different rates of tax on the fuel 
in question would they both have an incentive to misreport a transaction. Suppose thnt 
a seller had to pay a low tax rate on fuel consumption while its buyer had to pay a high 
tax on fuel it burned. Both parties would have an incentive to underreport the volume 
of fuel transferred from the seller to the buyer. The seller would be assumed to have 
consumed more fuel than it actually did (and its tax burden would increase) but jointly 
the parties would minimize their tax burden because the increase in the tax payable by 
the seller would be more than offset by the decrease in tax owed by the buyer. Presuma-
bly the buyer would make a side-payment to the seller that would enable the two parties 
to split the tax savings. The incentive for this type of misreporting of transactions im-
pedes designing a carbon tax in which different rates would apply to different entities. 
Hence, it is difficult to design a carbon tax that is directly progressive. See infra sections 
II.C.3.b.(3) and (4) on the regressivity of a carbon tax. 
82. One example of such an instance is at the retail level: gas stations. In this con-
text legislation can be easily enacted and implemented to protect the consumer. Many 
states already have extensive motor-fuel monitoring programs. Enforcement agents al-
ready spotcheck gas pumps to make sure that fuel quality matches the octane rating 
advertised. In some states these same enforcement agents also check to make sure the 
pump correctly measures the volume of gasoline expelled. See, e.g., 1991 Conn. Act 91-
322 (Reg. Sess.); CoNN. GEN. STAT. §§ 16a-14b, 16a-15 (1990); MINN. STAT. 
§ 325E.09 (3) (Supp. 1991); Miss. CoDE ANN. § 15-55-6 (1990); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 47-18-1305 (1991). The Environmental Protection Agency has also spotchecked fuel 
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The double-reporting method of promoting CBT compliance can-
not work if there is no entity against which to cross-check a firm's 
purchase or sale of fuel. For example, the taxpayer that extracts 
coal from a mine does not obtain that coal from a seller; therefore, 
no seller would report the amount of coal to which the taxpayer has 
access. To eliminate or reduce its tax burden, this taxpayer will 
have every incentive to underreport the amount of coal extracted up 
to the amount it actually burns. Thus, to capture the tax that im-
porters and extractors should have to pay on the fuel they burn, it 
would be necessary to police directly the amount of fuel extracted 
and/or imported. This policing function would also have to be car-
ried out in a mine-mouth, well-head or dock tax, as well as under a 
CBT. 
Inter-agency cooperation between the Internal Revenue Service 
and Customs officials would be the appropriate mechanism for po-
licing the volume and type of fossil fuels imported into the United 
States. 83 Similar cooperation between the Internal Revenue Service 
and the Environmental Protection Agency could facilitate policing 
the quantity of natural resources that are extracted from the ground 
domestically. Foregoing the tax due by extractors who consume 
some of the fuel they produce may mean only modest revenue re-
ductions. However, such foregone revenue would directly subsidize 
the very firms that should not (for environmental reasons) receive 
governmental subsidies, the fossil-fuel industries. 
The end of the chain of production also presents an enforcement 
problem under the CBT scenario. This problem occurs only when 
fossil fuels are sold on a retail level to mass market consumers and 
exists because imposing a reporting requirement on purchasers who 
are ordinary consumers is unrealistic. Even if receipts correctly 
identify the type and amount of fossil fuel purchased and the tax-
payer identification number of the seller, taxing ordinary consumers 
is highly impractical. For example, when consumers .line up at the 
pump to purchase gasoline, they are unlikely to save their receipts. 
quality at the gas pumps. See William R. Greer, Of Pings. Pumps and Mislabeled Gaso-
line, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 6, 1986, § 4, at 5. 
83. For instance, currently under I.R.C. §§ 46ll(c)(2)(B), 46ll{f), 9509 (1990) (pro-
viding for the Petroleum Excise Tax for Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund), a tax is imposed 
on both domestic and imported crude oil. The tax on the imported oil "is imposed on 
the person importing the product into the United States for consumption, use, or wnre-
housing." JoiNT CoMMITI"EE ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RE-
LATING TO FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL TAX POUCY (JCS-6-90), Mnr. 1, 1990, at 10 
[hereinafter JCf: FEDERAL ENVTL. TAX PoL'Y]. The same enforcement mechanism 
used to ensure the collection of this tax could be used to ensure the collection of the 
carbon tax on imported fossil fuels. 
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The large number of such fuel transactions per year makes report-
ing them on tax returns administratively burdensome and for all 
practical purposes makes the reporting requirement impossible to 
enforce. As a matter of administrative convenience, the best solu-
tion to this problem may be to presume that all fuel sold on the 
retail mass market will be burned and will emit carbon dioxide into 
the atmosphere. Instead of imposing the tax on the taxpayers who 
actually burn the fuel, it may be easier in this instance to impose the 
tax on the retail sellers. Thus, retail sellers of fuel would not be 
permitted to reduce volume of fuel purchased by volume of fuel sold 
to determine the amount of fuel on which they should be taxed. 
They would be taxed on the entire volume of fuel purchased. Re-
tailers would then increase fuel prices so that at least part of the tax 
would be borne by the ultimate consumers, those who burn the fuel. 
No similar problem occurs in the electric utility sector because 
utilities burn all their carbon fuel before the electricity produced 
reaches ordinary consumers. The problems at the gas pump, de-
scribed above, are associated only with sales of unburned fuel made 
directly to mass retail consumers. Therefore, such problems should 
not occur in the production of electricity. The distributors of elec-
tricity buy finished non-fossil-fuel goods and thus have no 
purchases of unburned carbon fuels to report. Likewise, the sellers 
of these goods cannot report having sold any unburned carbon fuel, 
and hence, cannot claim any credit. At this stage of production, all 
fuel has been burned, and thus, all CBT has already accrued. 
This end-of-production problem with the CBT would not arise 
for retail sales of non-fuel goods that are produced with electricity 
or from the combustion of fossil fuels. In both of these situations, 
all fossil fuels have already been burned and, thus, all carbon taxes 
have already accrued before any mass retail market becomes in-
volved. The sale of a non-fuel product will not trigger an increase 
in volume of carbon fuel resold because no fuel with the potential to 
release carbon dioxide into the atmosphere will have changed 
hands. Likewise, the purchase of the good will not trigger the buyer 
to report any extra volume of carbon fuel purchased. Similarly, a 
manufacturer's use of electricity would not be a taxable event to 
that entity under a CBT because the electricity purchased does not 
emit carbon dioxide when consumed. The manufacturer would not 
recognize any volume purchased, and so the utility company could 
not claim a credit for any volume sold. 
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c. Conclusions Regarding Where in the Production Cycle a 
Carbon Tax Should Be Imposed 
247 
Determining on whom a carbon tax should be imposed is a com-
plicated task. The determination depends on a number of factors. 
Among them are: how much of the tax (when imposed at various 
stages of production) is likely to be passed all the way to ultimate 
purchasers of goods and thus how much the tax can be expected to 
shift consumption decisions toward more environmentally sound 
items; how many entities will be subject to tax (administrability); 
whether or not some independent means for verifying the volume of 
fossil-fuel combustion exists at the stage proposed to be taxed (en-
forcement); how broad-based the tax will be if imposed at one point 
of production but not at others; and whether or not imposing the 
tax at a certain point will influence fossil fuel burners to switch to 
cleaner fuel sources and more efficient equipment. To answer these 
questions fully would require economic models estimating the inci-
dence of a carbon tax. Such models are beyond the scope of this 
article. 
Even without knowledge of the precise incidence of the tax, it 
seems qualitatively correct that a CBT would serve conflicting 
goals: maintaining a broad tax base and potentially influencing 
both burners' production and ultimate consumers' consumption de-
cisions. Additionally, through the use of a cross-reporting system, 
taxpayers would know that revenue officials have the means to 
check their self-reported figures of volume purchased and volume 
sold. This knowledge would serve as a check against the tendency 
to underreport tax liablity, thus improving both administrability 
and enforcement of the tax. 
2. Feedstocks 
If the government implements a system taxing fossil fuels prior to 
their use, the potential for overtaxation exists since many fossil fuels 
are not burned but are used as ingredients in the production of 
goods. Whenever a fuel is taxed, and that tax is passed on to a 
purchaser in the form of a higher price, that buyer bears the burden 
of the tax. Under a carbon tax, many manufacturers would 
purchase fuel at a price that takes into account the tax and that 
presumes use of the fuel in a way that pollutes. However, many 
manufactUrers would then use the fuel as a feedstock. Those manu-
facturers will have paid for the environmental damage of burning 
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the fuel without having burned it. 84 Given the rationale underlying 
the carbon tax, it becomes necessary to refund the tax collected on 
that amount of fuel. If administratively feasible, the government 
should allow the feedstock user to claim a refundable credit by sub-
tracting from its tax bill the amount of fuel used as feedstock multi-
plied by the appropriate tax rate. 85 
Administration of a feedstock credit would be quite difficult. 
Under the current self-reporting system, manufacturing companies 
could and would have every incentive to overestimate the quantity 
of fuel used as a feedstock per item produced. Additionally, the 
business could attempt to evade taxes by claiming to have used a 
high-carbon (and, therefore, highly taxed) fossil fuel as a feedstock 
when it, in fact, used only a low-carbon fossil fuel. As a result, it 
would receive an excessively large credit. This example of evasion 
could appear whenever a product could have been manufactured 
using substitute types of fuel as feedstocks. 
These taxpayer abuses would be difficult to detect. Accurately 
determining, by mere inspection, which fossil fuels are in a piece of 
steel is an ambitious task. 86 Trying to determine the relative quanti-
ties of each fuel further complicates the determination. For exam-
ple, many different grades of steel contain different relative amounts 
of fuels as ingredients. Enforcement of the feedstock credit would 
require extensive laboratory testing of manufactured products. In 
many cases even laboratory testing would not sufficiently reveal 
how much fuel has been used as a feedstock. Taxpayer overestima-
tion of this amount results in an equal underestimation of the 
amount of fuel actually burned. This type of tax evasion would lead 
to the undertaxation of carbon dioxide emissions. 
The government could combat this undertaxation in two ways. 
First the government could prohibit any feedstock credit. This 
would simplify administrability and ease enforcement, but would 
compromise theoretical soundness and would adversely and inequi-
84. See Hoerner, Energy Taxes Would Hurt, supra note 47, at 1215. 
85. The Internal Revenue code currently taxes similarly those chemicals that are 
used as feedstocks in the context of the excise tax on ozone-depleting chemicnls (I.R.C. 
§ 4681 (Supp. 1991)). The tax on ozone-depleting chemicals does not apply to those 
used as feedstocks in the production or manufacture of other chemicnls if the "ozone· 
depleting chemical is entirely consumed in the production of [the other] chemicnl [and 
if the production of that other] chemical does not involve releasing an ozone-depleting 
chemical into the atmosphere." See Jcr: FEDERAL ENVTL. TAX PoL'Y, supra note 83, 
at 13. 
86. Letter from Maxine C. Champion and Nicholas C. Talerico, LTV Corp., to Ken· 
neth W. Gideon, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury (July 
12, 1990), summary available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 90 TNT 167-44. 
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tably affect those industries that use substantial amounts of fossil 
fuels as feedstocks (e.g., the plastics, steel, and chemical industries). 
An alternative solution would be to establish a system to prevent 
the potential misreporting abuse. An example of such a system 
would be a set of presumptions (probably set out by regulation) re-
garding how much of each type of fossil fuel is normally used as a 
feedstock in various manufactured intermediate goods. Estimates 
for presumptions of the quantity of fossil fuel used as a feedstock 
should be on the low side. To rebut such a presumption, manufac-
turers would have to prove use as a feedstock to the satisfaction of 
the Secretary of the Treasury for any fuel in excess of the presumed 
level. By setting the presumption levels low, companies which use 
less than the average amount of fuel as a feedstock would not get 
the benefit of an excessive credit. 
If the government designs a tax that allows a credit for the feed-
stock use of carbon fuels, and if the government does not choose a 
CBT tax, the following problem arises: the fuel producer would 
likely bear some of the tax if it were unable to pass all of it on to the 
fuel purchaser due to elastic demand, for example. If the purchaser 
later used that fuel as a feedstock, the purchaser should not get the 
benefit of the entire feedstock credit. The ensuing credit should be 
split between the producer and the burner in proportion to their 
relative burdens under the tax. 
It would be very difficult, however, to determine the correct pro-
portion for splitting the tax credit. From a revenue perspective, if 
no multiple-rate structure has been instituted in an attempt to make 
the tax progressive, it does not matter that the "wrong'' person 
bears the tax. Total tax revenue will not change. From the perspec-
tive of serving environmental goals, declining to split the credit be-
tween fuel producer and feedstock user may not be harmful: the 
entity that gets the benefit of the full credit (the one that uses the 
fuel as a feedstock) is taxed proportionately less than firms which 
burn all their fuel. This creates an incentive to use fuel as a feed-
stock rather than to burn it, especially where there is a choice. 
Since use as a feedstock does not contribute to carbon dioxide emis-
sions, this incentive enhances environmental goals. 
The party harmed by not allowing a split of the tax credit is the 
fuel producer (or the party on whom the original tax was imposed). 
The economic harm to producers should be weighed against the 
massive administrative costs associated with trying to split the 
credit fairly. Since administrative costs are likely to outweigh any 
benefit to producers, the credit probably should not be split. 
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Even under a CBT, it would make sense to split the feedstock 
credit among the feedstock user (F) and the previous owner (P) of 
the fuel. Even though P received a credit when it sold its unburned 
fuel to F (and, therefore, P paid tax only on the fuel it burned), the 
sale price of the fuel P sold to F could have been suppressed because 
of the existence of the carbon tax, which diminishes the value of 
dirty fuels. To the extent that the price was lower than it would 
have been absent a tax, P bore the carbon tax imposed on F. Since 
F used the fuel as a feedstock and did not pollute, that fuel should 
not have been taxed. Theoretically, P and F should split the ensu-
ing feedstock credit in proportion to their respective burdens under 
the tax. Determining the actual incidence of the tax, however, is 
administratively impossible. As in the non-CBT scenario, prohibi-
tively expensive administrative costs indicate that the feedstock 
credit should not be split. 
3. Addressing the Regressivity of a Carbon Tax 
a. Is the Carbon Tax Regressive? 
Much of the political opposition to a carbon tax centers around 
the claim that, as a fiat tax, it acts in a highly regressive manner. 
Energy expenditures appear to account for a greater proportion of 
income for low-income households than for those with high in-
comes. 87 If the rich and the poor both use one gallon of gasoline to 
drive to work or one hour of electricity to run a heater, the tax 
applies regressively since both individuals shoulder the same tax 
burden. The degree of regressivity of a fiat carbon tax is, however, 
subject to debate. Measuring consumption by using the "life-cycle" 
or "permanent-income" method rather than the traditional "an-
nual-income" method may be a more reliable means of determining 
how different households are affected relative to each other and how 
regressive a tax actually results. 88 Although the "life-cycle" and 
87. Corcoran & Wallicb, supra note 15, at 171. 
88. See James Davies et al., Some Calculations of Lifetime Tax Incidence, 14 AM. 
EcoN. REv. 633 (1984); James M. Poterba, Lifetime Incidence and the Distributional 
Burden of Excise Taxes, 19 AM. EcoN. REv. 325 (1989). These measures may be more 
reliable than the traditional annual income measure because the year-to-year variation 
in a household's consumption is not necessarily directly related to the household's an-
nual variations in income. The economic assumption is that individuals set their levels 
of consumption on the basis of their expected long-run incomes {not on what their 
current incomes happen to be). They can do this because of the ability to borrow 
money to finance current consumption when cash is short in the near term and they 
expect larger future income and because of the ability to save when current income 
exceeds expected long-term income. Essentially, it is presumed that individuals make 
consumption decisions based on their expected average income over their life-cycle. 
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"permanent-income" measures indicate that a carbon tax will apply 
somewhat regressively, the degree of regressivity will be much less 
than the traditional measure suggests. 89 
Additional factors make the carbon tax less regressive than 
claimed by some on Capitol Hill. First of all, opponents of the tax 
ignore the fact that a tax becomes less regressive if it successfully 
shifts behavior.90 If low-income households improve their energy 
efficiency in response to higher fuel costs, they will reduce their tax 
by cutting consumption. Currently feasible ways to shift behavior 
include insulating one's home (so that electric heat could be set 
lower and used less), car-pooling, and using mass transit more 
often. A carbon tax would be less likely to encourage the wealthy 
to conserve energy because the wealthy can more easily afford price 
increases in fuels such as home-heating oil. They may willingly pay 
the additional charges rather than conserve by insulating their 
houses or by driving more fuel-efficient cars. If a carbon tax en-
courages a· greater shift in behavior among lower-income house-
holds than among wealthier ones, that mitigates the regressivity of 
the tax in dollar terms.9I 
Those who emphasize the regressivity of a carbon tax also fail to 
consider the possibility that corporate producers of goods and fuel 
producers will bear a substantial portion of the tax burden. If this 
turns out to be the case, then it can be argued that wealthy owners 
of close corporations and well-off stockholders of publicly traded 
companies will bear a large burden of the carbon tax. For example, 
airlines may not be able to pass on the entire cost of the tax in the 
form of higher prices of tickets. If so, airline owners will bear the 
tax burden in the form of smaller dividends or a lower return on 
89. See CBO: REDUCING nm DEFICIT, supra note 47, at 424. 
Some economic studies conclude that a tax imposed on gasoline would, under the life-
cycle measure of income, actually be somewhat progressive. 
[L]ow-expenditure households devote a smaller share or their budget to gasoline than 
do their counterparts in the middle or the expenditure distribution. Although house-
holds in the top five percent or the total spending distn""bution spend significantly less 
on gasoline (as a share or expenditures) than those who are less well-off. s=line's 
expenditure share is much more stable across the population tho.n the mtio or s=line 
outlays to current income. 
JAMES M. POTERBA, Is TilE GASOUNE TAX REGRESSIVE?, (Nat'! Bureau or Economic 
Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Working Paper No. 3578, 1990). 
90. Robert D. Hershey, The Budget Agreement: Who Will Pay; Tax Burden Expected 
to Fall on People of Moderate Means. N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1990, at 1A. 
91. Of course, if the wealthy are the only individuals who can afford to change their 
behavior, then the tax might increase regressivity. Although regressivity might be miti-
gated should the poor shift behavior more than the rich, the shift itself represents an 
added burden on the poor. In this sense a carbon tax remains regressive. 
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investment. Under this scenario, the tax would not be as regressive 
as some in Washington claim.92 Additionally, a greater increase in 
the price of luxury goods than in the cost of "necessities, might 
reduce regressivity.93 
Political opposition, rather than good-faith concerns about the 
vertical inequities of the tax system, appears to be the motivating 
force behind arguments that carbon taxes are regressive. Taxes that 
are more regressive than a broad-based carbon tax currently exist 
(e.g., the social security payroll tax).94 No serious political action 
has been taken to eliminate them or to make them less regressive. 
The regressivity justification for opposing carbon taxes seems 
hollow and has probably been emphasized more because of its rhe-
torical effect than because of any desire to institute sound tax 
policy. 
b. Dealing with Regressivity 
(1) Use of a Broad Base 
Although a carbon tax is probably more progressive than tradi-
tional economic measures and current political rhetoric would indi-
cate, it likely retains some regressivity. This regressivity could be 
addressed in a number of ways. The first way to minimize the 
regressivity of a carbon tax is to broaden its base as much as 
possible.95 
(2) Use of Companion Measures 
The second way to reduce the possible regressive impact of the 
carbon tax would be to enact companion measures unrelated to the 
underlying purpose of the carbon tax. These would not be provi-
sions which make the carbon tax directly progressive, but rather, 
ones that accomplish that goal indirectly. Companion measures are 
simply independent tax provisions which make the tax system as a 
whole more politically palatable, offsetting any vertical inequities 
which a pure carbon tax alone might impose. Examples of such 
companion measures include: reducing social security taxes (and 
92. It should be noted that other corporate stakeholders could bear the burden of any 
tax borne by the corporate entity. If this were the case, a carbon tax falling on corpo-
rate producers of goods or of fuels may ultimately fall on lower-income employees 
rather than on upper-income households and could thus remain regressive. To deter-
mine the incidence of a carbon tax requires economic studies beyond the scope of this 
article. 
93. Corcoran & Wallich, supra note 15. 
94. See Red Ink. Green Taxes, supra note 15, at 11. 
95. See supra notes 47-55 and accompanying text. 
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other highly regressive taxes);96 providing a refundable tax credit 
for low-income individuals;97 providing direct subsidies for those 
households in the lowest income brackets (those households which 
earn so little that they are not required to file returns at all); and/or 
instituting more progressive income tax rates, provided that the car-
bon tax can raise sufficient replacement revenue.98 
(3) Direct Progressivity Through a Multiple-Rate System 
A multiple-rate tax system may provide a third way of making a 
carbon tax progressive, whether imposed on one entity or on many. 
A carbon tax would be imposed on fossil fuels (yet to be burned or 
already burned) at the stage where the finished good first becomes 
identifiable. A classification system differentiating among necessi-
ties, discretionary goods and luxury items would have to be devel-
oped, and the regular carbon rates would be multiplied by low, 
medium, or high product rates, respectively. Necessities would be 
taxed at the normal carbon rate, and luxury goods would be taxed 
at much higher carbon rates. 
However, definitional and cultural problems concerning how to 
classify goods make this system difficult to implement.99 It would 
also be difficult to administer because of the need to delay taxing 
fuel that has already been burned until the authorities can deter-
mine what kind of good will ultimately be produced. Much fuel 
would be burned in the production of intermediate goods (i.e., steel) 
before the proper rate of taxation for that combustion would be 
96. See Dower & Repetto, supra note 9, at 712; see also Edward P. Jones, Komanoff 
Proposes a Carbon Tax, 42 TAX NOTES 1524 (1989) (citing Roger Sant of the Environ· 
mental and Energy Study Institute (EESI)); Red Ink. Green Taxer. supra note IS, at 11. 
97. Sandra Postel & Christopher Flavin, Reshaping the Global Economy, in 1991 
STATE OF THE WoRLD, 170, 182-83 (Lester Browned., 1991); telephone interview with 
Mamie Stetson, Technical Staffer ofWorldwatch Institute (Feb. 15, 1991). 
98. See GORDON, supra note 5, at 180-81; Postel & Flavin, supra note 97, at 182; see 
also Tun Gray, Downey and Gore to Propose Broad-based Energy Tax, 50 TAX NOTES 
1215 (1991); Gray, White House, supra note 15, at 813-14. 
99. For example, is electricity a necessity or a lwrury? If used for a lamp, most 
would agree that it is a necessity. If used to power a private greenhouse, many would 
call it a luxury. No desirable way of differentiating among consumer uses of electricity 
currently exists. Hence, a multiple rate system would, in this context. be both theoreti-
cally and pragmatically difficult to implement. Uses of transportation fuels pose the 
same classification difficulties. If someone flies across the country to sttend a relative's 
funeral, that individual's use of the jet fuel might not be considered extravagant. On the 
other hand, a Sunday drive through the country could be considered a luxurious and 
wasteful use of transportation fuel. The above examples illustrate that cultural values 
(which vary across the taxable population) will affect whether or not an individual con-
siders some specific use of fuel to be a luxury or a necessity. This complicates the fair 
implementation of a multiple-rate system as well as its enforcement. 
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known.100 Under a CBT, producers of such goods would not know 
their tax liability until after they sold their finished product. This 
makes it difficult for the producers to pass their tax liability through 
to the purchaser of the intermediate good because they will not 
know how much they should increase their prices. Because authori-
ties would have to defer taxation under a multiple-rate system until 
the final product of fuel consumption could be identffied, a multi-
ple-rate system should not be undertaken. A differential-rate sales 
tax would probably be a more effective and easily administered 
method of importing progressivity directly into a carbon tax. Such 
a sales tax would, however, retain the problems inherent in trying to 
classify goods as luxuries, necessities, or other subcategories. tot 
(4) Problems with Direct Progressivity 
There exist several major obstacles to making a carbon tax di-
rectly progressive, as opposed to enacting companion measures to 
accomplish the same goal indirectly. The difficulties are present 
whether the government imposes the tax on one entity or on many 
(as in the CB1). The first problem relates to the theoretical purpose 
of a progressive system. Progressive taxes should improve the stan-
dard of living of the poor relative to that of the wealthy. Standards 
of living apply to people, not to corporations. Therefore, it makes 
little sense to import progressivity into the corporate tax rates. This 
is especially true since individuals ultimately bear the impact of cor-
porate taxes and these individuals' relative wealth cannot be pre-
dicted in advance (i.e., they could be low-wage workers or wealthy 
corporate owners). 
Inevitably, companies would bear some portion of a carbon tax 
somewhere along the production line.102 If carbon levies tax more 
heavily those goods designed to be consumed only by the wealthy, 
then wealthy consumers will bear the tax only to the extent that the 
charge can be passed along to them in the form of price increases. 
100. It should be taxed at luxury rates if used to produce a luxury car but should be 
taxed at low rates if used to produce a more practical car. 
101. For example, foods are normally considered necessities. Yet, within the broad 
category of food there are "staples" such as potatoes and "luxuries" such as chocolate. 
Who should determine what constitutes a staple and what constitutes a luxury? Also 
within the same type of good, there is product differentiation. Some varieties of the 
good are marketed to the wealthy; some are not. Should different varieties of mush· 
rooms be classified differently according to whether an agency employee considers a 
"normal" mushroom to be sufficiently different from a "gourmet" mushroom? How 
fine-tuned should a classification system attempt to be? 
102. Not all of the tax would be passed on to final consumers in the form of price 
increases because of elastic demand, for example. 
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If part of the tax were borne by a producing company, and then 
ultimately by the company's low-wage workers, the tax would be 
highly regressive. Lower taxes on necessary items, which the poor 
purchase in greater proportions will result in lower relative costs to 
the poor only to the extent that the smaller price increase is passed 
on to them. Yet a portion of the low tax on necessary goods will be 
borne by the producing companies rather than by ultimate consum-
ers. Assuming that the beneficiaries of the lower rate own the com-
panies, the progressive rate structure creates a perverse result. The 
owners of production, who may be wealthy, would be taxed at a low 
rate because the incidence of a carbon tax falls partly on the pro-
ducer, not entirely on the ultimate consumer. The progressive rates 
would not effectively be coordinated with the wealth of the person 
who ultimately bears the tax. Thus, the multiple-rate system may 
well fail to serve vertical equity. 
For similar reasons, it would make no sense to tax producers at 
different rates based on the volume of carbon fuel they use. The 
amount of fuel burned by a company has no relationship to the 
wealth of the person who ultimately must bear the tax burden. 
These problems illustrate the absurdity of making carbon taxes di-
rectly progressive when imposed on a corporate entity rather than 
on individual consumers of fuels, manufactured goods and services 
(according to the wealth of the consumer). 
A directly progressive carbon tax would pose a second problem 
by creating the potential for tax avoidance, which exists in any mul-
tiple-rate tax system. Assume that the fuel burner is the individual 
on whom the tax is imposed and that taxes are directly progressive 
based on the Adjusted Gross Income of the taxpayer. The more net 
income a company generates, the greater the rate of carbon tax 
which would apply to the company. One tax avoidance technique 
that could arise would be the unreported resale of fuel from low-
rate companies to high-rate entities. The unreported resale would 
be accompanied by a side payment from the high-rate to the low-
rate business, representing a division of the net tax savings occur-
ring because of the transaction. The two companies would jointly 
save taxes at the government's expense. This problem could proba-
bly be addressed only through litigation.103 This ineffective and 
inefficient means of dealing with unreported fuel resale weighs 
103. Administrative functions similar to those performed in antitrust enforcement 
concerning the existence of an agreement, either tacit or express, would have to be 
undertaken in order to combat the problem. 
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against instituting progressivity into a carbon tax directly, especially 
since the tax can be made less regressive through indirect means. 
Another tax avoidance technique that would invariably emerge 
under a directly progressive carbon tax is the recurring problem of 
income splitting. Assuming the same facts as in the above explana-
tion, single entities would divide themselves into many corporate 
bodies, each small enough to ensure lowest-bracket net income. 
Any fuel burned would thus be taxed at the lowest possible carbon 
rate. This problem could be combatted either through litigation to 
prove intent, 104 by requiring a calculation of the carbon tax liability 
as though a consolidated tax return were filed, or by requiring all 
affiliated companies to use the same tax identification number for 
fuel-combustion purpos.es. 
c. Conclusions Regarding the Regressivity of the Carbon Tax 
Companion measures offer the best way to improve the progres-
sivity of a carbon tax.105 Designing a directly progressive carbon 
tax poses difficult administrative, theoretical and enforcement 
problems. Companion measures may provide more efficient and ef-
fective means for introducing progressivity into the tax system as a 
whole. Care should be taken in setting each measure, however, be-
cause each method can only roughly offset carbon-tax regressivity. 
4. The Threat to International Competitiveness of a Carbon 
Tax 
a. What Is the Effect on International Competitiveness? 
Opponents of a carbon tax argue that its imposition would detri-
mentally affect the ability of U.S. companies to compete interna-
tionally. Those U.S. companies which burn carbon fuels to produce 
goods would see their costs increase as a result of the tax. Corpo-
rate advocates warn that either the resulting increased prices of U.S. 
goods would render those goods uncompetitive with foreign-made 
goods106 or the manufacturer, in order to maintain current relative 
prices and to compete against foreign substitutes, would have to 
104. Litigation would be an expensive and relatively ineffective method for combat-
ting this problem. 
105. See supra text accompanying notes 96-98, 102-04. 
106. Assuming equivalent total non-tax input costs, untaxed foreign goods would be 
cheaper both here and abroad than domestically-produced goods subject to the tax. 
Thus, for goods which compete on world markets, consumption would shift from those 
goods subject to the U.S. carbon tax to those goods which are not. To the extent that a 
carbon tax increases the domestic costs of production significantly, there would be an 
incentive for companies to move production facilities overseas. These companies would 
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bear the entire cost increase due to the tax. This would decrease 
profitability in such companies. For already floundering industries, 
any decrease in sales or in profitability could mean doom. 107 
Some commentators suggest that it is fair to tax domestic produ-
cers of goods because many foreign producers must already pay 
large energy taxes.I08 Though a carbon tax would put U.S. compa-
nies "on par' with their foreign competitors in this regard, it is still 
arguable that the adverse effect of the tax on domestic producers 
would not be equitable. This would be the case, for example, if en-
ergy taxes imposed overseas were less than the proposed domestic 
tax. Currently only Sweden and Finland have set their fuel taxes 
high enough to account for the environmental damage associated 
with carbon dioxide emissions.109 Other countries have not set their 
energy taxes sufficiently high. Therefore, an energy tax in the U.S. 
set at the "correct'' level110 would exceed that which most foreign 
producers must pay. Imposition of a domestic carbon tax on U.S. 
producers would tend to exacerbate the harm to U.S. competitive-
ness that is already aggravated by other factors such as exchange 
rates and the higher domestic costs of many non-energy inputs. III 
then import the untaxed goods for consumption in the U.S. Of course, this method of 
tax avoidance would also exacerbate domestic unemployment. 
107. See supra note 86. 
108. 137 CoNG. R.Ec, Hl109, 1110 (daily ed. Feb. 21, 1991)(stntement of Rep. 
Stark). See also GoRDON, supra note 5, at 49. 
109. James M. Poterba. Tax Policy to Combat Global Warming: On Designing a Car-
bon Tax 4 (Sept. 1990)(unpublished manuscript on file with the UCLA Journal of Envi-
ronmental Law and Policy). Sweden's carbon tax, however, exempts heavy industrial 
users of carbon fuels, undermining its effectiveness at reducing carbon dioxide emis-
sions. International Taxes, supra note 8, at G-3. 
110. See infra Section II.C.6 on the appropriate tax level. 
111. Some authorities suggest that U.S. industry will not be advCISely affected by a 
carbon tax if industry adoptS currently available technology to improve energy effi. 
ciency. They argue that foreign companies currently compete in world markets even 
though subject to much higher energy costs than U.S. companies. See 137 CoNG. R.Ec, 
H1109, 1110, (daily ed. Feb. 21, 1991)(remarks of Rep. Stark). This implies that 
greater energy efficiency leads to greater competitiveness for foreign companies. Indus-
try in some foreign countries, such as Japan, is currently somewhat more energy effi. 
cient than it is in the U.S. "Japanese industry uses energy twenty to forty percent more 
efficiently than we do." Id. However, the greater energy efficiency of Japanese industry 
does not account entirely for its ability to compete successfully (m the face of higher 
energy costs) against U.S. producers. Energy prices in Japan exceed those in the United 
States by more than twenty to forty percent. For example, gasoline sells at a price over 
250 percent higher in Japan than in the United States. See GoRDON, supra note 5, at 
49. Therefore, factors other than superior energy efficiency must also contnoute to the 
ability of Japanese producers to compete in the face of higher energy prices. One such 
factor is the perception in consumer markets that Japanese products offer superior qual· 
ity. Another factor is a difference in non-energy input costs. Japanese labor, for exam-
ple, costs much less than U.S. labor. See Jobs/or Japan's Next Generation, EcoNOMIST, 
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Imposing a carbon tax on domestic producers would place them, 
relative to foreign manufacturers, in a net inferior position in many 
instances. This would be true whether the tax were imposed on a 
single entity in the U.S. chain of production or on many (as in the 
CBT). Other unavoidable costs to U.S. industry that would tempo-
rarily harm its international competitiveness are the transitional 
costs associated with moving capital and labor from energy-inten-
sive industries to those that are less so.112 
Some analysts contend that, overall, a tax on carbon fuels (as-
suming taxation of both domestic and imported fuels) would re-
duce, not increase, the trade deficit. They reason that since fuel 
imports now comprise approximately forty to forty-two percent of 
the trade deficit, 113 a tax-driven reduction in oil consumption would 
Feb. 27, 1988, at 51 ("The measure of Japan's success is the containment of its unit 
labour costs: these rose a mere 1h% in 1987, compared with 2 3/•% in America."); see 
also, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, INTERNATIONAL 
CoMPARISONS OF HOURLY CoMPENSATION Cosrs FOR PRODUCTION WORKERS JN 
MANuFACTUIUNG 1975-90, (1991) (Japanese manufacturing labor costs were only 86% 
of the United States' labor costs). Essentially, foreign industries, such as those in Japan, 
fund the energy taxes they pay by using energy more efficiently and by incurring rela-
tively lower wage expenses. Cheap Japanese labor subsidizes expensive energy. In the 
U.S., on the other hand, cheap energy currently subsidizes relatively expensive labor. 
For U.S. industry to sustain increased energy prices without losing competitiveness in 
international markets would require a reduction in non-energy input costs. It may or 
may not be politically acceptable to sacrifice the individual standard of living (measured 
in terms of lower wages) for the ultimate goal of improving the overall standard ofliving 
(measured by the economic and non-economic benefits of avoiding the greenhouse effect 
and achieving cleaner air). To avoid a downward pressure on market wages, the gov-
ernment could use policy instruments to reduce the costs of other inputs instead (e.g., 
the government could use the revenue raised from a carbon tax to reduce tlle budget 
deficit. This would reduce interest rates, and lower the cost of capital. See 136 CoNG. 
R.Ec. D854 {daily ed. July 11, 1990) (statement of Rohatyn); Red Ink. Green Taxes, 
supra note 15, at 11; and CBO: CARBON CHARGES, supra note 8, at 33. 
Finally, to mitigate the societal costs of reducing non-energy input costs, energy effi-
ciency should be improved as much as possible. The adoption of already-existing tech-
nologies would improve energy efficiency and reduce carbon dioxide emissions. See 
OmcE OF TECHNOLOGY AssESsMENT, CHANGING BY DEGREES: STEPS TO REDUCE 
GREENHOUSE GASES 5 {1991) (asserting that the United States could cut thirty-five 
percent of its carbon dioxide output in twenty-five years without "major technological 
breakthroughs •••. Existing equipment would not have to be instantly scrapped and 
replaced with untested prototypes. The requisite energy-related technologies are either 
already available or are demonstrated and close to commercialization today." I d. at 6.) 
Additionally, much can be done to encourage development of new technology that can 
improve energy efficiency to an even greater extent. For example, the tax system could 
subsidize research and development in energy efficiency. This could be accomplished by 
instituting investment tax credits or accelerated depreciation (or immediate expensing) 
for energy-efficient equipment. 
112. These costs are temporary. See discussion on phase-in in section I.E, and see 
supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
113. Telephone interview with Cynthia B. Foreso, U.S. International Trade Commis-
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cause a concomitant reduction in oil imports.114 The decrease in 
imports should, in turn, reduce the trade deficit. 
Another argument advanced which also suggests a beneficial ef-
fect on the trade deficit from carbon charges concerns the use of 
carbon-tax revenue. If money raised from a carbon tax were used to 
decrease the budget deficit, then domestic interest rates should de-
crease. This reduced borrowing cost should decrease operating 
costs for all U.S. companies and improve the competitiveness of 
U.S. companies relative to foreign concerns. us As long as the re-
duction in the cost of capital exceeds the net increase in energy costs 
(taking into consideration induced efficiency improvements), the 
overall trade position of U.S. industry should be enhanced.116 
Whether or not a carbon tax would have an overall negative im-
pact on the U.S. trade position poses a difficult question, one which 
is the subject of economic research. According to the Congres-
sional Budget Office, 
[t]hough carbon charges would be unlikely to affect the overall U.S. 
trade deficit indirectly, they might affect the competitiveness of some 
industries. Carbon charges could indirectly improve the U.S. overall 
trade deficit if they were used to reduce the federal deficit. [Citation 
omitted]. The overall trade position is determined largely by 
macroeconomic factors, such as the levels of national saving and in-
vestment. However, exports of industries that are relatively heavy 
users of carbon-based fuels would be reduced accordingly. Other, less 
carbon-intensive U.S. industries competing in import or export mar-
kets could gain from the carbon charges.117 
b. Protection of Domestic Industry 
(1) Border Adjustments 
Assuming that energy-intensive industries would, in fact, face in-
ternational competitiveness problems as a result of a carbon tax, the 
tax should be implemented in a way designed to combat the prob-
lem. Imposing border adjustments could serve concerns over inter-
national competitiveness. 
sion, Energy and Chemicals within the Office of Industries (January 8, 1991). For the 
first eight months of 1991, imports of crude petrol, gasoline, refined products, and coal 
accounted for forty to forty-two percent of the trade deficit. 
114. Red Ink, Green Taxes, supra note 15, at 11. 
115. Although interest rates are relatively low as of the writing of this article, budget 
deficit reduction would lessen any upward pressure on rates. 
116. See CoNGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE: POUCIES FOR REDUCING THE CUR-
RENT-ACCOUNT DEFICIT (1989). 
117. CBO: Carbon Charges, supra note 8, at 37. 
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(a) Functioning of Border Adjustments 
In theory, for border adjustments to protect all U.S. industrial 
interests perfectly, all fuel, intermediate and finished imports as well 
as exports should be subject to an adjustment.118 Exporters of U.S. 
goods would receive a credit for the total amount of carbon tax 
incurred as a result of the production of that good. Importers of 
foreign fuels or products would be taxed according to the carbon 
content of the energy source imported or according to the quantity 
and type of carbon fuel consumed in the production of the imported 
good. To the extent that foreign governments have already imposed 
a sufficient energy tax on the fuel or good being imported (but have 
not granted their own export credit), the U.S. should not tax the 
import. Imposing an import tax in that case would effectively con-
stitute double taxation of emissions and would discourage the 
purchase of the double-taxed goods. This would discourage foreign 
countries from enacting their own carbon tax legislation. 
The result of taxing imports and granting refundable tax credits 
to exporters would be that the prices of all goods sold for use in the 
United States would include a component for the environmental 
cost of carbon dioxide emissions. The prices of goods sold for use 
outside of the United States would not include any of the costs asso-
ciated with carbon dioxide emissions (unless foreign governments 
have instituted their own carbon taxes). 
Taxing imports and granting credits for exports could compro-
mise the goal of reducing carbon dioxide emissions worldwide. 
Prices abroad for energy-intensive U.S. goods would not take into 
account the environmental costs associated with producing the 
goods. Thus, this credit for exports would not adequately discour-
age the worldwide consumption of energy-intensive U.S. products. 
(b) Legality of Border Adjustments 
Border adjustments present two types of problems: their legality 
under various trade agreements and enforcement difficulties. At 
least one organization, the Natural Resource Defense Council 
(NRDC), has addressed the legality of border adjustments under 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the U.S.-
Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA). According to a project at-
torney for the NRDC, the imposition of a carbon tax on imported 
118. "[T]ax imports based on consumption of fossil fuels in their manufacture to 
prevent countries with no fossil fuels tax from driving energy-intensive U.S. products off 
the market." Hoerner, Climate, supra note 15, at 1416. 
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goods would be permissible under Article XX of GATT and Arti-
cles 410 and 1201 of the FrA.119 Because the import tax would be 
"equivalent" to internally imposed taxes, it would not violate these 
international agreements.12o 
Even if the border adjustments were construed to violate the 
GAIT's prohibition against import taxes, 121 GATT's prohibition 
119. Letter from Eric Christensen, project attorney for the Nnturol Resource De-
fense Council to Kenneth W. Gideon, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, U.S. Dep't of 
the Treasury (October 10, 1990) a~·ailable in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT file. 
Article401 oftheFTAspecifically deals with the type of import tax ... propose[d]. 
It requires that: 'Neither party shall increase any existing customs duty, or introduce 
any customs duty, on goods originating in the territory of the other Party ••. ' Article 
410 defines 'customs duty' as: '[A]ny customs or import duty and chnrge of any kind 
imposed in connection with the importation of goods, including any form of surtax or 
surcharge on imports, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF: 1) A CHARGE 
EQUIVALENT TO AN INTERNAL TAX imposed consistently with the provisions 
of paragraph 2 of Article III of the GATT in respect of like domestic goods or IN 
RESPECT OF GOODS FROM WHICH THE IMPORTED GOOD HAS BEEN 
MANUFACTURED OR PRODUCED IN WHOLE OR IN PART ...• ' 
The highlighted language contemplates precisely the kind of import fee ..• pro-
pose[ d) because it is 'equivalent' to the proposed internal U.S. tax on carbon fuels, and 
those carbon fuels are used to produce the imported goods that would be taxed. 
This view is confirmed by Article III of ... GATT, which is incorporated by refer-
ence into the FTA. Article 410 of the FTA, as quoted above, allows import duties to 
be imposed if they are consistent with GATT Article III, paragraph 2. Article SOl of 
the FTA also incorporates GATT Article III by reference. GATT Article UI, para· 
graph 2, states that 'The products of the territory of any contmcting p:uty imported 
into the territory of any other contmcting party shall not be subject, directly or indi-
rectly, to internal taxes ••. in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like 
domestic products.' The proposed carbon tax would not violate Article III because it 
would merely equalize the burdens created by the carbon tax on domestic and foreign 
producers. It would not impose an import tax 'in excess of' those faced by domestic 
producers. 
Even if the proposed import tax were held to be a new import duty in violation of 
Article 401 or other provisions of the FTA, it would still be legal under Article 1201 
of the FTA. Article 1201 incorporates GATT Article XX into the FTA. GATT 
Article XX(g) allows otherwise impermissible measures if those measures relate to 
'the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made in con· 
junction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.' Because the car-
bon tax is aimed at reducing consumption of fossil fuels, it can be viewed as n measure 
taken to conserve exhaustible [natural resources}. Therefore, even if it is considered a 
trade barrier, the proposed carbon tax would be allowed under Article XX(g) of 
GATT and, by reference, Article 1201 of the FTA. 
120. Note that taxing imported fuel and/or intermediate or final goods alone without 
taxing domestic fuel would be contrary to energy security goals and would violate inter-
national trade agreements. The imposition of an oil-import fee alone, for example, 
would promote depletion of domestic oil supplies, and increase future U.S. vulnernbil-
ity. See Red Ink, Green Taxes, supra note 15, at 11. 
· 121. A border adjustment taxing imports might violate the last sentence of Article 
m, paragraph 2. This sentence states "[m]oreover, no contracting party shnll otherwise 
apply internal taxes or other internal charges to imported or domestic products in a 
manner contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1.'' Paragraph 1 states, "The 
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against subsidies, 122 or to create a dual pricing situation fitting the 
definition of dumping, 123 it appears that one of the GA TT's general 
exceptions would apply. Article XX allows exceptions for public 
health regulations.124 Article XX(g) allows contracting parties to 
adopt measures "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with 
restrictions on domestic production or consumption" even though 
those measures otherwise conflict with GATT as long as the "meas-
ures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where 
the same conditions p~evail, 125 or [as] a disguised restriction on in-
ternational trade."126 As long as border adjustments meet these last 
two requirements, they would not violate the GATT. 
It appears that border adjustments under a carbon tax would 
comply with the FTA. The United States and Canada incorporated 
GATT Article XX into the FTA. Border measures prohibited 
under FTA Article 401 could, therefore, be imposed if they meet 
any of Article XX's general exceptions. When incorporating 
GAIT's Article XX into the FTA, the United States and Canada 
made Article XX "[s]ubject to the provisions of Articles 409 and 
contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal charges ••• alfecting 
the internal sale ••. of products, ••• should not be applied to imported or domestic 
products so as to afford protection to domestic production" (emphasis added). Border 
adjustments in the carbon tax would be imposed for the purpose of protecting domestic 
production, ergo the violation. Since the requirement of Article III, paragraph 2 mny 
not be met, the import adjustment may also violate Article II, paragraph 2. Article II, 
paragraph 2 permits charges such as the border adjustments described above but only if 
they are consistent with paragraph 2 of Article ill. Nevertheless, sales taxes imposed 
on imports which are equivalent in burden to sales taxes on domestic goods hnve not 
been deemed to afford impermissible protection to domestic production and thus to 
violate GA'IT. See Report of the Panel, United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Cer· 
tain Imported Substances, BISD 348/136, 138, §§ 2.2, 2.3-2.6, 5.1.9, 5.2.5, 5.2.7- 5.2.8, 
and 5.2.10, reported in HANDBOOK OF GAIT DtsPUTE SETI'I.EMENT (Pierre Pescatore 
et al., eds. 1991). 
122. The tax credit for exports would constitute a subsidy. See General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade, 1947, art. XVI, 55 U.N.T.S. 250. Nevertheless, a tax credit for 
exports has not been deemed to be a "subsidy'' under GATT in the VAT context. See 
supra note 121, at § 5.2.4. 
123. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 122, at art. VI, 55 
U.N.T.S. 212. 
124. Kenneth W. Abbott, Introduction to Regulation of International Trade: The 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1989), LEXIS, I trade library Basic Docu-
ments of Import-Export Law (1 b.d.i.e.l. 3). 
125. E.g., imports that have already been subjected to a foreign carbon tax should 
not be taxed again by the United States. 
126. General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, supra note 122, at art. XX, 55 
U.N.T.S. 262, 264. 
HeinOnline -- 10 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 263 1991-1992
1992] CARBON TAX 263 
904."127 Article 904 provides that GA'IT's Article XX(g) applies 
in the energy context only if certain conditions are met. 128 These 
conditions would seem to be met by a carbon tax. Thus, GA'IT 
Article XX(g) would likely apply under FfA Article 1201. 
It appears that border adjustments imposed because of a domestic 
carbon tax would comply with both the GA'IT and the FfA pro-
vided that the import tax did not exceed the tax on domestic goods 
and that an export credit refunded no more to domestic corpora-
tions than the amount of carbon tax incurred. If an import tax 
based on the carbon dioxide emitted in a good's manufacture were, 
nevertheless, found to violate international trade agreements, the 
United States should attempt to negotiate amendments to the trea-
ties to allow for the imposition of such a tax. If negotiations fail, 
the use of border adjustments would then have to be foregone unless 
the United States wants to violate treaties with its trading partners. 
Assuming no such violation, the reduced international competitive-
ness of energy-intensive U.S. goods and the flight of production fa-
cilities to foreign countries would remain. 
(c) Implementation and Enforcement of Border Adjustments 
Implementation and enforcement present other problems associ-
ated with the institution of border adjustments. In the case of fuel 
imports, implementation of an import tax requires knowledge only 
of the quantity and type of fuel imported. In the case of imports of 
intermediate or finished goods, however, implementation of an im-
port tax necessitates knowledge of the quantity and type of fuel 
burned in the production of the import in question. For this reason, 
taxation of fuel imports is relatively easy to implement. Fuel im-
127. Free-Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Cnn., nrt. 1201, 27 LL.M. 281, 352 
(1988) [hereinafter United States Trade Agreement]. 
128. Article XX(g) of the GATI only applies if: 
(a) the restriction does not reduce the proportion of the total export shipments of n 
specific energy good made available to ••• [Canada] relative to the total supply of thnt 
good of the [United States] ••• as compared to the proportion prevailing in the most 
recent 36-month period for which data are avnilnble prior to the imposition of the 
measure ••. ; 
(b) the [United States] does not impose a higher price for exports of an energy good 
to •.• [Canada] than the price charged for such energy good when consumed domesti-
caliy, by means of any measure such as licences, fees, tnxntion and minimum price 
requirements. •.• ; and 
(c) the restriction does not require the disruption of normal chnnnels of supply to 
••• [Canada] or normal proportions among specific energy goods supplied to ••• 
[Canada] such as, for example, between crude oil and relined products and among 
different categories of crude oil and of relined products. 
Id. at art. 904, 27 I.L.M. at 344. 
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ports would be taxed at the same rates as domestic fossil fuels: high 
rates for coal, intermediate rates for petroleum, and low rates for 
natural gas. The rate would reflect the carbon content of the fuel. 
Only information about the volume and type of fuel imported must 
be collected. 
Where non-fuel goods are imported, however, implementation of 
an import tax presents increased difficulties. 
A charge on imported goods other than fossil fuels, based on their 
carbon content, would significantly increase the administrative costs 
of a carbon charge. As the charge would have to be levied on each 
good according to the fossil fuel used in producing it, the information 
requirements alone would be extremely burdensome.129 
Since carbon dioxide "emissions are a direct function of the amount 
and type of fuel burned,"t3o the Treasury would require informa-
tion from foreign producers regarding the quantity and type of fuel 
burned in the manufacture of each import. Of course, these foreign 
entities would have little incentive to provide accurate information. 
They would tend to underestimate the quantity of fuel that was 
burned in the production of the imports and to misreport the type 
of fuel burned. 
In order to combat this problem, the Treasury could develop esti-
mates of the amount of fuel normally burned to make a product. If 
the Treasury estimates were too low, a producer burning more fuel 
than estimated would have no incentive to conserve fuel burned be-
yond that threshold. High estimates can be used to correct this 
problem, giving producers the burden of proving less fuel consump-
tion if they have not burned as much fuel as the estimate. High 
estimates, however, pose the threat that the import tax would not be 
considered the "equivalent" of any domestically imposed tax, and 
would thus violate the GATT and the FTA.13t Additionally, creat-
ing presumed fuel-consumption estimates does not address the 
problem of producers misreporting the type of fuel burned. 
Estimating fuel consumed in the production of imports is proba-
bly an administratively impossible task. In addition to the above 
weaknesses inherent in estimates, there exist the following 
problems: estimates would have to be devised for every single type 
of good imported; estimates for each good would vary according to 
the country from which the imported good originates;132 all esti-
129. CBO: CARBON CHARGES, supra note 8, at 39, 42. 
130. /d. at 17. 
131. See supra note 121, at § 5.2.9. 
132. Estimates vary according to the country of origin because different producers 
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mates would have to be revised every three to five years as the time 
horizon for technological improvements lapses (yielding more effi-
cient use of carbon fuel or allowing the substitution of non-carbon 
fuels) lapses; and no international organization exists to police the 
accuracy of information provided for the initial or revised calcula-
tion of the estimates. 
Determining the amount of tax to be refunded (as a refundable 
credit) to fuel exporters would require knowledge of the quantity of 
unburned fuel exported. An owner of fuels that have already been 
taxed at the mine-mouth or well-head and which are exported 
would be eligible for a tax refund equal to the tax rate for the type 
of fuel in question multiplied by the quantity of fuel being ex-
ported.133 Verification of the quantity and type of fuel exported 
could be accomplished by coordinating policing functions with cus-
toms agents. 
Because of the difficulty of verifying the numbers reported, esti-
mating the amount of tax to be refunded is more complicated when 
intermediate or finished goods, rather than fuel, are exported. Ex-
porters would have an incentive to overestimate the quantity and to 
misreport the type of fuel burned in the production of the exported 
good. This would complicate implementation of border adjust-
ments in the same way that underestimation made administration 
impossible in the import context. Estimates of carbon dioxide emit-
ted in the production of various goods could be established, but 
have access to different means of production, some of which are more fuel eflicient 
(where the production process is labor-intensive or where machinery is new) and some 
of which are less fuel efficient. Variations in carbon dioxide emissions among producers 
of the same good also result from the availability of production equipment with differing 
degrees of energy efficiency. Those countries with the most economic and technologic:al 
access to advanced, energy-efficient equipment would emit the least carbon dioxide per 
unit of product imported into the United States. 
133. When the original fuel extractors actunlly bear part of the trut and then sell the 
fuel to other entities which subsequently export and receive the tax credit, a distortion 
would exist adversely affecting producers to the direct benefit of non-producer fuel ex-
porters. This is the same problem as that described above concerning credits to con-
cerns which use fossil fuels as feedstocks when the ultimate incidence of the carbon tax 
is such that it is not borne entirely by the fuel user. See text accompanying notes 85-87, 
supra. Since it is virtually impossible to determine the actual incidence of a carbon tax, 
splitting the credit in either case is not recommended. See text following note 87, supra. 
Either the extractor can receive the credit for fuel that is ultimately exported (at the 
expense of the exporter) or the exporter can receive the credit for fuel that is exported 
(at the expense of the extractor). Under either scenario, total revenue to the govern-
ment is the same. Unlike the feedstock situation, no environmental benefit would be 
gained from giving the credit to one party or the other. For administrative convenience, 
therefore, such a credit should simply be granted to the exporter even though the fuel 
producer bore a portion of the tax. 
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these estimates would suffer from the same defects as those from the 
import context: estimates should be designed to be low so that ex-
porting companies cannot be presumed to get a greater credit than 
that to which they would actually be entitled if actual carbon com-
bustion could be measured and verified; estimates would have to be 
devised for every type of finished and intermediate good; theoreti-
cally, the estimate should vary according to the energy-efficiency of 
each manufacturer;134 estimates should be revised every few years 
after implementation of more energy-efficient technology; and in de-
vising initial estimates, it would be difficult to verify whether manu-
facturers had provided correct information as to quantity and type 
of fuel burned. Even if estimates could be formulated, taxpayers 
could still misrepresent the fuel type burned. 
(2) Narrow the Scope of the Border Adjustments 
In spite of the possibility that some enforcement functions could 
be coordinated through interaction of tax officials and customs offi-
cials, establishing a comprehensive import tax and export credit 
would probably be prohibitively expensive from an administrative 
perspective. Omitting all forms of border adjustments from a car-
bon tax, however, would not be an attractive alternative because of 
the underlying competitiveness problem. Production inefficiencies 
would result which would drive production overseas, increase un-
employment and reduce total tax revenue to the government. 
In order to make the border adjustments administrable, they 
should be narrowed. Allfuel imports and exports would be subject 
to tax and credit respectively. Of intermediate and finished goods, 
only those which account for a large portion of combusted fossil 
fuel would be subject to border adjustments. Limiting the number 
of goods subject to the adjustments would reduce the number of 
estimates that the taxing authorities would have to derive and the 
policing that they would have to undertake. Consequently, ad-
ministrability would be simplified. 
If economic studies demonstrate that just a few such intermediate 
or finished goods account for a large portion of burned fuel, and if 
such studies can identify these goods with sufficient certainty, those 
goods should be the products chosen to be subject to the import tax 
and/or export credit.135 If the analysis shows that the total fuel 
134. See note 112 supra. 
135. Estimates would still need to be devised for these goods but the total number of 
estimates would be greatly diminished by narrowing the system of border adjustments. 
One economic study measured the significance of total fossil-fuel use in the production 
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burned producing imports and exports is insignificant compared to 
total fuel burned in the production of taxed domestic goods that are 
not exported, then the difficulties inherent in devising estimates 
would justify omitting border adjustments altogether.t36 
(3) Subsidies 
As an alternative to developing a border-adjustment system, the 
government could allocate some of the revenue generated by the 
carbon tax to those industries that suffer the most from reduced 
international competitiveness.137 The subsidies would not serve to 
compensate companies because they bum fuel, but rather, because 
they face foreign competition.138 Consumption in the United States 
of those energy-intensive goods which face significant foreign com-
petition would not be discouraged sufficiently because of the sub-
sidy; however, the system would still discourage production and 
consumption of energy-intensive goods not facing foreign competi-
tion. Therefore, to the extent that energy-intensive goods do not 
compete with foreign products, subsidies would not circumvent the 
environmental goals of the carbon tax. 
Using a direct-subsidy approach would, nevertheless, lessen the 
carbon tax's ability to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. Manufac-
of imported goods. This study suggests that "embodied energy imports are not trivial" 
and hence, cannot be ignored without risking major production inefficiencies (which 
would, most likely, result in the flight of production to foreign countries). The study 
also identified three main types of goods as constituting "a very large share of the em-
bodied fossll fuels": steel, autos, and chemicals. The study's author suggested that the 
administrative burdens of a carbon tax could be reduced by taxing only those imported 
goods that have substantial amounts of embodied fossil fuel energy. 
However, in stating which goods account for substantial embodied energy, the study 
falls to differentiate between the categories of energy burned and energy used as feed-
stocks. If the feedstock use of fuel should not be taxed because such use does not con-
tn'bute to the emission of carbon dioxide, then new studies should be undertaken which 
focus on identifying those imported goods that account for a substantial amount of 
fossil-fuel combustion. 
The author of the economic study points to the current U.S. treatment of CFC im-
ports as support for the feasibility of an import tax. Under I.R.C. § 4681, "[t]he Treas-
ury is empowered to estimate the CFC content of imported goods, and in cases where 
this estimate is impossible, can levy [a] tax of up to five percent on imports." See 
Poterba, supra note 109, at 24, 25 n.18. 
136. The problem remains, however, that production facilities could flee the country 
to avoid the tax. 
137. 137 CoNG. R.Ec., supra note 15, at 1110. Also, any policy which reduces costs 
of operating for companies facing international competition would offset the increased 
cost of fossll fuels. Dower & Repetto, supra note 9, at 712. 
138. Of course, instituting such a subsidy system domestically, especially for these 
reasons, could constitute a violation of the GATT prohibition against subsidies. See 
GATT article XVI. 
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turers of energy-intensive goods that do receive a subsidy because of 
foreign competition would overproduce, thereby continuing to emit 
too much carbon dioxide. If the government nevertheless guaran-
teed the subsidy for a number of years, regardless of whether produ-
cers reduced their actual fossil fuel consumption, environmental 
goals could still be served somewhat. Under a guaranteed-subsidy 
plan, producers would have an incentive to conserve energy because 
they could reduce their total energy costs by cutting energy con-
sumption without losing the governmental subsidy. As a result, 
their carbon dioxide emissions could eventually diminish. 
c. Reasons to Act Unilaterally in Spite of a Threat to 
International Competitiveness 
Even if a carbon tax would dampen U.S. international competi-
tiveness, unilateral action domestically could promote world wide 
reduction of carbon dioxide emissions in the long run. Because of 
every country's concerns over international competitiveness, a col-
lective action problem exists which impedes including environmen-
tal costs in the price of goods. No one country wants to act first 
because, in the absence of border adjustments, its own relative trade 
position would deteriorate. Each country faces the choice of either 
maintaining the status quo or adopting a carbon tax while suffering 
a consequent reduction in the competitiveness of its goods. 
Once one major trading country acts without instituting adjust-
ments, however, the choice facing other countries changes. The for-
eign countries will be aware that should they fail to institute their 
own systems of carbon tax, the competitive trade advantage they 
enjoy because of a U.S. tax would be short-lived because the United 
States could and would revert to its original position by repealing 
the tax. Therefore, once the United States adopts a carbon tax, the 
options available to foreign countries become either to enjoy a 
short-lived trade advantage that fosters the spiral down toward 
more global warming (i.e., the countries do not enact their own car-
bon taxes and the U.S. repeals its tax as a result) or to adopt their 
own carbon taxes, which would lead to greater reductions in carbon 
dioxide emissions around the world without causing any net change 
in trading positions. 
The fact that under either scenario a foreign country would even-
tually lose its trade advantage indicates that the decision it makes 
can be formed by environmental and production issues. The choice 
need not be shaped by trade issues. The institution of a carbon tax 
by the United States would act essentially as an invitation to other 
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countries to adopt similar measures. Therefore, if the United States 
were to adopt a carbon tax, the probability that worldwide emis-
sions could stabilize or decrease improves because trading partners 
may find it more politically and economically feasible to enact their 
own carbon taxes. 
5. Regional and Industrial Inequities of a Carbon Tax 
a. Sources of Inequities 
The institution of a carbon tax, whether imposed on only one 
entity or on many, as in a CBT, would adversely affect some regions 
of the country and some industries more than others.139 This re-
sults because some regions depend more on fossil-fuel energy than 
others, due to relative labor costs or a local supply of dirty fuel, 140 
or because of the need to travel greater distances to accomplish 
daily tasks in rural locales. Similarly, some industries are more 
highly energy-intensive or have historically used dirtier fuels than 
have other industries. The sources of industrial inequities of a car-
bon tax include the feedstock use of fossil fuels in some industries 
but not in others, the fact that some industries face international 
competition while others do not, and the simple fact that some in-
dustries burn more fuel than others. A carbon tax would affect 
some industries more adversely than others to the extent that the 
tax code does not or cannot address the feedstock issue or the re-
duced international competitiveness problem.141 Assuming that the 
special problems of feedstocks and international competitiveness 
can be dealt with in the code, tax designers must find a way to re-
duce the regional and industrial inequities likely to result from a 
carbon tax. 
b. 11ze Use of a Broad Tax Base to Lessen Inequities 
Both regional and industrial inequities would be reduced by a 
broader-based carbon tax.l42 "The broader the tax, the more 
139. See, e.g., 137 CoNG. REc., supra note 15, at 1110; Dower & Repetto, supra note 
9, at 711; Hoerner, Future, supra note 24, at 12. 
140. Energy-producing states like Texas, California, Ohio, and Pennsylvania would 
be hurt more than other states. See National Coal Association, Incidence of a Carbon 
Tax by State, TAX NoTES, microfiched on Doc. 90-6688, for an analysis of the relative 
effects of a carbon tax on different states. 
See also Corcoran & Wallich, supra note 15, at 171 (claiming that citizens in states in 
the West and South which use more nuclear power and/or hydroelectricity would be 
unfairly advantaged by a carbon tax). 
141. See sections ILC.2 and II.C.4 supra. 
142. See section II.C.3.b (1) supra, and text accompanying notes 47-51. 
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widely its burden is likely to be shared across the country."143 For 
example, a carbon tax would hurt coal producers and coal-produc-
ing regions of the country less if it were imposed not only on coal 
(at high rates) but also on oil and natural gas, thus, making it possi-
ble (given constant revenue) to lower all rates charged. A carbon 
tax should apply to all carbon dioxide-emitting fuels, for the burden 
to be shared as widely as possible among all regions and among all 
types of fuel-burning industries.144 
Likewise, inequities among industries which bum fossil fuels 
would be mitigated by making the tax broadly based. If only coal 
were taxed, for example, the steel industry (a heavy coal burner) 
would bear a greater tax burden (both in absolute and in relative 
terms) than industries which do not bum much coal. So would the 
electric utility industry since it consumes coal heavily.145 If oil and 
natural gas as well as coal were taxed based on relative carbon con-
tents, then those industries which primarily bum oil and natural gas 
would share with the steel and electric utility industries the burden 
of the carbon tax. All rates would be lower than if only coal were 
taxed, and the steel and utility industries would not be treated in 
such an inequitable fashion. 
c. The Role of a Phase-In 
Phasing in the carbon tax would provide another manner of re-
ducing both regional and industrial inequities.146 A phase-in helps 
mitigate these inequities by giving consumers and producers in 
heavily hit industries or parts of the country time to adapt to higher 
energy prices before they occur. For example, people who live in 
rural regions of the country, who have to drive further than city 
dwellers, will have a few years before the full brunt of the tax must 
be borne, allowing them to considez: fuel efficiency when buying new 
cars. Since they will be more heavily affected by the full-fledged 
143. See Red Ink. Green Taxes, supra note 15, at 11. 
144. See Komanoff, supra note 72, at A15; Steven Mufson, Will Industries Really 
Suffer from Tax Rise?, Targeted Sectors See Dire Results; Economists Eye Offietting 
Benefits, WASH. Posr, July 15, 1990, at Hl (proposing that the broader the tax base, the 
less regressive and the more equally shared among different industries the tax will be). 
See generally, Hoerner, Energy Taxes for Deficit, supra note 15; Hoerner, Future, supra 
note 24, at 12 (discussing narrow taxes on gasoline, SOx/NOx, ozone emissions, and on 
solid wastes). 
145. Although in the utility industry, regulators can pass the tax burden on to ulti-
mate consumers by increasing prices. It is likely that kilowatt-hours consumed would 
decrease, however, which could reduce profitability of electric companies. 
146. See, e.g., Dower & Repetto, supra note 9, at 712; CBO: CARBON CHARGES, 
supra note 8, at 35-37. 
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carbon tax than those who live in the city, they will become more 
efficient users of gasoline during the interim phase-in period than 
will city dwellers. Consumers will know to buy more fuel-efficient 
appliances and will have a few years to acquire them as old ones 
wear out. 
The phase-in also mitigates industrial inequities. Tlie time period 
before the tax achieves full force provides time for companies to 
institute plans for increasing efficiency and promoting conservation. 
Fossil fuel burners will have time to change production methods 
from those which use dirty fuels to those which use cleaner fuels. 
They will also have time to identify and contract with suppliers of 
those cleaner fuels. Some utility companies may be able to retool 
and switch some of their input fuel from coal to cleaner fuels. Dur-
ing the phase-in period, both human and financial capital would 
have time to move out of industries which contribute greatly to car-
bon dioxide emissions and to move into those which do not, while 
manufacturers could alter their product lines in environmentally 
sound ways. For example, car manufacturers would have time to 
bring more fuel-efficient autos to commercialization. Thus, they 
can make adjustments that will minimize cost increases and others 
which will minimize reduction in demand for their products. While 
the phase-in does not completely eliminate the inequities that a car-
bon tax presents, it does reduce their impacts. 
d. The Use of Subsidies 
It has been suggested that revenue derived from the imposition of 
a carbon tax could be used to offset some of the regional and indus-
trial inequities the tax creates.147 The use of carbon tax revenue in 
this manner would help to reduce its inequities. To the extent such 
rebates encourage retraining and relocation of displaced workers or 
retooling by inefficient fuel burners (or burners who use the dirtiest 
fuels such as electric utilities), these rebates would not hamper the 
environmental goal of reducing carbon-dioxide emissions. Rebates 
should not, however, be used to address those industrial inequities 
that result solely from the fact that some industries require more 
combustion of fossil fuels than others. In essence, such rebates 
147. See 137 CoNG. REc., supra note 15, at 1110 ("A carbon tax will not nfi"ect all 
sectors of the national economy equally. I believe that some of the money raised by the 
carbon tax should be used to mitigate problems caused by the carbon tax whether the 
problems are regional or those felt by low-income individuals.") See II.C.3 supra; 
Dower & Repetto, supra note 9, at 712; telephone interview with Perry Plumart, rude to 
Rep. Stark (January 29, 1991)(revenue should be used to offset industrinl inequities). 
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would subsidize the worst carbon-dioxide polluters solely because 
they are the worst carbon-dioxide polluters, thus subverting the 
purpose of the carbon tax and undermining its environmentally 
sound effects. A carbon tax is designed to make energy-intensive 
goods more expensive than other goods. To grant rebates because 
the tax falls more heavily on those industries that burn more or 
dirtier fossil fuel would allow the price of energy-intensive goods to 
remain too low. Consumption patterns would not shift toward 
more environmentally sound goods. Since the carbon tax is 
designed to cause the contraction of those industries which require 
large amounts of fossil-fuel combustion, rebates to these industries 
should be avoided. 
6. Factors to Be Taken into Account When the Level or 
Amount of Tax Is Set 
a. The Environmentally Correct Level 
Theoretically, a carbon tax, regardless of its design, should reflect 
the environmental costs of fossil-fuel combustion.148 "Ideally, one 
would estimate the expected value of future risks associated with 
the discharge into the environment of an additional unit of pollu-
tion"149 and would set the tax to adjust fuel prices accordingly. Of 
course, the precise estimates of environmental damage remain un-
certain. In the absence of an ability to set the tax at the theoreti-
cally correct level, care must be exercised to determine the 
minimum level necessary to achieve environmental goals. 
b. Raising Revenue Versus Changing Behavior 
In setting the level of any tax, a tension exists between raising 
revenue and affecting shifts in behavior. "The level of tax deter-
mines the effect: small taxes serve only to raise revenue, while high 
taxes shift demand. The major limitation of taxation is the political 
resistance to setting high enough taxes to change demand and pro-
mote innovation." 150 The level of tax should be high enough to pro-
mote change in technology. If the tax remains too low, for example, 
many electricity users will forgo conserving energy and will instead 
148. See Dower & Repetto, supra note 9, at 711. 
149. ld. Since the carbon tax addresses the environmental impact of only carbon 
dioxide emissions, the rate of tax to be imposed would be set by taking into account the 
environmental harm caused only by carbon dioxide emissions. It would not take into 
account the environmental impact of other substances emitted upon fossil-fuel 
combustion. 
150. GORDON, supra note 5, at 178-79. 
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choose to pay higher bills. The small amount of tax avoided would 
not justify the expenditures required to purchase energy-efficient ap-
pliances or to insulate homes. Likewise, a low tax could not induce 
transportation companies to purchase more energy-efficient ma-
chinery. It certainly would not prompt research into and develop-
ment of newer, cleaner technologies. 
c.· Inflation 
The legislature should not overlook the effect over time that infla-
tion has on fixed tax amounts. Inflation erodes the tax's ability to 
discourage fuel consumption by reducing the constant-dollar value 
of the tax over time.151 Therefore, any non-ad valorem energy tax 
should be indexed to inflation. 
d. Effect of Dynamic Underlying Fuel Prices 
In implementing a carbon tax that will be effective in shifting en-
ergy users from dirty to relatively clean fuels, the tax rates must be 
set so that the post-tax fuel prices will reflect relative carbon con-
tents.152 In other words, the tax rate on coal, the dirtiest fuel, 
should be set so that the ultimate price of coal will exceed that of a 
cleaner fuel, thereby ensuring that relative final prices proportion-
ally reflect relative carbon contents.153 Tax rates initially fixed ac-
cording to current relative fuel prices would not keep post-tax coal, 
oil and natural gas prices perfectly calibrated because the underly-
ing pre-tax fuel prices change.154 Underlying fuel prices are not 
151. See CBO: REDUCING 11JE DEFICIT, supra note 47, at 433; H.R. 1086, 102d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); see also notes 160-62 infra and accompanying text. This second 
version of Rep. Stark's carbon tax bill adds a provision to index the tax to inflation. 
152. See CBO: CARBON CHARGES, supra note 8, at 19; and CBO: ENERGY USE, 
supra note 2, at ch. 1, +6. 
153. The difficulty of accomplishing this is exacerbated by the fact that it is virtually 
impossible to determine (ex-ante or even ex-post) how much a given tax will affect the 
final consumer prices of fuels and goods. 
154. This problem is likely to occur in the carbon tax scenario because once the post-
tax price of coal rises sufficiently to stave off demand, the pre-tax price will decrease. 
The smaller pre-tax price plus the fixed tax amount will no longer add up to the "de-
sired" final price. A new equilibrium price will result but will be lower than the desired 
final price. Coal will be too cheap and demand will increase again to a certain extent. 
Some of the initial decrease in the demand for coal likely resulted from consumer substi-
tution of oil or natural gas for coal. The increased demand for natural gas, for example, 
would have increased the pre-tax price so that this larger (new equilibrium) pre-tnx 
price plus the fixed tax amount would add up to too high a final price. Natural gas 
would thus be too expensive, and demand would decrease somewhat. The efi'"ects of 
external supply shocks on the pre-tax relative prices of the various fuels also exemplifies 
the problem of fixing the tax according to the relative pre-tnx prices of the fuels at one 
particular point in time. 
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static. Therefore, the tax rates must be adjusted as relative fuel 
prices change. 
e. Effect of Carbon Tax on the Economy 
Different levels of carbon tax will have different effects on overall 
GNP.155 Most estimates of the effect on GNP do not account for 
the positive environmental benefits that such a tax might achieve (or 
the negative environmental effects of failing to take precautions 
against global warming). In determining whether or not to institute 
action discouraging carbon dioxide emissions, estimated costs to the 
economy should include the environmental benefits or harms from 
acting or failing to act.t56 
Because the use of fossil fuels pervades almost every facet of in-
dustrial society, estimates of the effect of a certain level of carbon 
tax on the economy are subject to much uncertainty.t57 Notwith-
standing this uncertainty, a carbon tax will likely result in some net 
cost to the economy (when environmental costs of failing to act are 
not taken into account). One model estimates that a tax of $100 per 
ton of carbon would reduce consumption of electricity by about 
eight percent and of transportation by about six percent.158 
155. According to the Congressional Budget Office, a tax of $100/ton of carbon on 
fossil fuels (enough to stabilize carbon dioxide emissions at 1988 levels) would increase 
the price of oil and natural gas at the point of extraction by about SO% and the price of 
coal by about 250%. The price increase of oil and natural gas to ultimate consumers is 
estimated to be only 25%. The estimated long-term reduction in GNP of a tax at this 
level is only 1%. CBO: CARBON CHARGES, supra note 8, at 19, 20 {table 2), 35 (table 
5). 
156. See Hoerner, Climate, supra note 15, at 1417. But see id., at 1416. 
157. According to a recent report published by the Office of Technology Assessment, 
the estimated total cost to the economy from the institution of a tax sufficient to stabi-
lize carbon dioxide emissions ranges from a $20 billion savings to a $150 billion loss. 
OFF. OF TECH. AssESSMENT, CHANGING BY DEGREES: STEPS TO REDUCE GREEN• 
HOUSE GASES, ci(ed in Michael Weisskopf, No 'Breakthroughs' Needed to Curb Global 
Warming, Hill Agency Suggests, WASH. PoST, Feb. 9, 1991, at A3. The following pas-
sage sheds some light on how the imposition of carbon charges could introduce net 
savings into the economy (without taking into account the environmental benefits that 
could result): "The carbon tax will have many positive effects on the economy. There 
will be new investment in energy saving devices by both individuals and corporations. 
The tax will encourage increased use of alternative energy sources. Research and devel-
opment in energy efficiency will be spurred. [Thus, new industries will emerge]. Money 
saved on energy will be spent for other goods [to the extent that the amount of money 
saved exceeds tax revenues]. The economic advantages of a reduced budget deficit will 
ripple through the economy and help international competitiveness." 137 CONG. REc., 
supra note 15, at 1110. 
158. CBO: CARBON CHARGES, supra note 8, at 29, Figure 2. 
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7. General Enforcement Concerns 
Tax evasion presents a pervasive challenge in enforcing a carbon 
tax. Since taxpayers can manipulate reported figures easily and 
with little fear of detection, 1s9 there will be an incentive for fossil-
fuel burners to underreport their tax liability. A carbon tax must, 
therefore, create a reasonable possibility that non-compliance will 
be detected and that appropriate penalties will be applied. 
Audits should be undertaken (mcluding examinations of a com-
pany's operating facilities) to induce taxpayers to report their fuel 
consumption accurately. In order to foster compliance by mid-level 
burners, the IRS should audit both companies which bum large 
volumes of fossil fuels as well as those that bum smaller volumes. 
This is a critical step since the sum of the taxes owed by companies 
responsible for burning medium or small amounts of fuel may ex-
ceed the total amount owed by those taxpayers who bum relatively 
large amounts of fuel. 
If the administrative burden of policing so many small and me-
dium-volume burners exceeds the revenue to be generated, a better 
approach might be for designers to set a threshold volume-burned 
level beneath which no tax payment would be triggered. Although 
this would reduce the incentive of small and medium-volume burn-
ers to alter their behavior, administrability would be simplified. 
Some degree of auditing would still be necessary, however, in order 
to make sure companies claiming no liability actually operate below 
the threshold. 
If possible, the IRS must show taxpayers that it has independent 
knowledge of fuel consumption. Accomplishing this task would 
minimize a taxpayer's belief that it could misreport fuel consump-
tion without being caught. Requiring two entities to report a trans-
action in their respective tax returns (as under a CBT) will assist in 
achieving this goal. 
Upon discovering misreporting through an audit or a cross-check 
with other returns, the IRS should impose a penalty in excess of the 
actual tax owed; otherwise, taxpayers would have no incentive to 
report correct consumption levels. The correct tax would eventu-
ally be paid but only after discovery of the cheating. To deter re-
peated cheating and to provide other taxpayers with an example of 
what happens as a result of misreporting fuel consumption, penal-
ties should be set fairly high. 
159. E.g., the amount and type of fuel used as a feedstock, the amount and type of 
fuel burned in the production of imports or exports, etc. 
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D. Political Problems and Prospects 
Enacting a carbon tax presents a major credibility problem. If 
constituents believe that lobbying would result in the repeal of the 
tax, then they would resist making the necessary investments for 
achieving more efficient fossil-fuel use. If industry believes that the 
tax will be short-lived, it will invest neither in currently available, 
energy-efficient equipment nor in research and development for the 
creation of more advanced technology. For an energy tax to affect 
consumption patterns, Congress must convince the public that the 
tax has been adopted for the duration. Otherwise, it may be impos-
sible for the tax to induce sufficient reductions in carbon dioxide 
emissions. Utility companies would not switch from coal-burning 
equipment. Transportation companies would not retool. Car man-
ufacturers would refrain from introducing ultra-energy-efficient 
automobiles into their product lines because of fear that consumer 
purchasing habits would not shift. 
So far, Congress has considered only one specific carbon tax pro-
posal, H.R. 4805, 101st Cong., 2d Session (1990) (reintroduced in 
virtually identical form as H.R. 1086, 102d Cong., 1st Session 
(1991)). This proposal, submitted by House Democrat Fortney 
Pete Stark of California, proposes different rates for different types 
of fuels according to their carbon content. The bill also provides 
that the tax be imposed at the dock, mine-mouth or well-head (i.e., 
on the entity that introduces the energy source into the economy). 
The bill would tax fuel producers who burn fuel on their premises. 
However, the Stark proposal does little to fine-tune the tax to 
actual carbon dioxide emissions since, for example, it provides no 
feedstock credit. Also, the Stark proposal probably sets the tax 
level too low to affect a shift in consumption patterns away from 
energy-intensive goods. Stark sets the tax at $30 per ton of carbon 
contained in the fuel, much less than the $100 per ton tax the Con-
gressional Budget Office estimates is necessary to stabilize carbon-
dioxide emissions at 1988 levels by the year 2000.160 Thus, the tax 
would probably be more effective in raising revenue than in reduc-
ing carbon-dioxide emissions. 
The Stark bill contains the following features: it. indexes the level 
of the tax to account for inflation, and it cushions the economy by 
providing that the tax be phased in. However, the Stark bill lacks 
provisions to account for imports and exports of intermediate and 
160. CBO: CARBON CHARGES, supra note 8, at 19. 
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finished goods, problems of decreased international competitive-
ness, and enforcement. 
The Stark proposal has been languishing in the House Committee 
on Ways and Means. It has no co-sponsors and its odds of passage 
are low as evidenced by the passage of H.R. 438 in the fall of 1990. 
This resolution expressed the House sentiment that excise taxes on 
fossil fuels and carbon emissions should not be imposed. Although 
the political chances for the Stark bill seem slim at this time, there 
have been indications of bilateral public support for some kind of 
carbon tax (though probably not at the level required to influence 
consumption patterns significantly).161 Educating the public about 
the relationship between fossil-fuel combustion and the greenhouse 
effect and its consequences appears to be the most likely manner of 
garnering political support for a carbon tax.t62 
Producers of clean fuels would probably experience gains relative 
to the dirtier fuels (the natural gas industry, for example, would 
probably be subsidized relative to the coal industry). As a conse-
quence, clean-fuel producers might lobby in favor of a carbon tax, 
thus improving its likelihood for passage. Major opponents of a 
carbon tax will include coal producers, coal-producing states, and 
industries which have historically used the dirtier fossil fuels (e.g., 
the utility and transportation industries). 
Given signs of public support for a tax that promotes environ-
mental goals, other specific proposals will likely be forthcoming 
once the economic slowdown reverses. The political palatability of 
a carbon tax can be improved to the extent it can be made progres-
sive and broad-based. The public would probably favor a tax im-
posed at the dock, the mine-mouth or the well-head as opposed to 
being imposed directly on consumers. 163 Also, the smaller the tax, 
the stronger the public support. If the issues of international com-
petitiveness and feedstocks can be addressed adequately, the 
chances for passage of a carbon tax would improve. Some of the 
aids to political palatability would further environmental goals (e.g., 
feedstock credit) while some may inhibit those objectives (e.g., a 
public desire for a smaller tax). Care should be exercised that the 
161. See J. Andrew Hoerner, Taxes and Energy Strategy: Will Congress Supplant 
Bush?, 50 TAX NoTES 432, 434 (1991); America at the Crossroads: A National Energy 
Poll, TAX NoTES TODAY, Jan. 15, 1991, a1•ai/able in LEXIS, Fed tax Libmcy, TNT File; 
90 TNT 210-70. But see Public Opposes Energy Taxes, Claims Edison Electric, TAX 
NoTES TODAY, Oct. 15, 1990, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Libmcy, TNT file. 
162. See structure of the national energy poll questions, a1·ai/able in LEXIS, Fed tax 
Library, 91 TNT 12-23, which essentially do this. 
163. See Hoerner, Energy Taxes for Deficit, supra note 15, at 1588. 
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designers of the tax, in making it politically acceptable, do not com-
pletely undermine the underlying environmental goals. 
m. 
CONCLUSION 
A. Design Recommendations 
A carbon tax would serve to correct the failure of the market to 
account for some of the environmental externalities associated with 
fuel combustion. Since the tax would pose inequities and could be 
complicated to enforce, its design is of utmost importance. Either 
taxing the fuel once at the dock, the mine-mouth or the well-head, 
or using a CBT structure, would render the tax broad-based. On 
the other hand, imposing the tax on one entity at a later stage of 
production would inhibit a broad base. 
Many of the enforcement problems involved in policing a tax 
based on the volume of fuel available for combustion would be miti-
. gated if a CBT were implemented instead of a dock, mine-mouth or 
well-head tax. Under a CBT, the buyer of a fuel must report all of 
it as having been burned (with the exception of feedstock fuel) un-
less it can find another party willing to incur tax liability and report 
that it has, in tum, bought some of the fuel. Because of this mecha-
nism for heightened compliance, a CBT is preferable to a system 
that imposes the tax on just one entity. 
Taxpayers should receive a credit for fuel used as a feedstock 
since such use will not result in carbon-dioxide emissions. Whether 
or not the government institutes a CBT system, the credit should 
not be split among the many bearers of the tax because of the great 
administrative costs in trying to do so. 
A carbon tax is likely to be somewhat regressive. Authorities 
should not attempt to make the tax directly progressive through the 
use of multiple rates because of the enforcement and administrative 
complications that would result. Rather, regressivity should be 
combatted by making the tax base as broad as possible and by en-
acting companion measures. Such measures could include reducing 
other regressive taxes, increasing the progressivity of other taxes, 
providing a refundable credit for low-income households, and pro-
viding for direct transfers to the lowest-income individuals. 
The carbon tax may harm the international competitiveness of 
some U.S. industries which are heavy burners of fossil fuels. A nar-
row border-adjustment system (if permitted under trade treaties) 
would provide a workable mechanism to counteract this harm. AI-
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tematively, the government could grant subsidies to those energy-
intensive industries which face significant foreign competition (as 
long as such subsidies would not violate trade agreements). In spite 
of the damage to short-run international competitiveness, many en-
ergy-using industries can improve their positions by becoming more 
energy efficient and by using cleaner fuels. Additionally, unilateral 
action by the United States removes the disincentives many other 
countries face when considering their own unilateral measures. 
Imposing a carbon tax will result in many regional and industrial 
inequities. Designing the tax to be broad-based and phasing it in 
over time would lessen the severity of such inequities. Revenue 
from the tax should be used to retrain and relocate displaced work-
ers and to help dirty-fuel industries retool. The revenue should not 
be used, however, to subsidize energy-intensive industries simply 
because of the tax burden they must bear. Such subsidies would 
subvert the purpose of the tax altogether, which attempts to dis-
courage the combustion of dirty fuels. 
A carbon tax should be set high enough to encourage conserva-
tion and the shift to cleaner fuels. It should be indexed to inflation 
and should function to make post-tax fuel prices proportionate to 
various fuels' relative carbon contents. To mitigate any net adverse 
effect the tax may have on the economy, the tax should be phased-
in. 
To make the tax effective, the public must perceive it to be a per-
manent addition to the Code. To improve compliance, taxpayers 
must be shown that the numbers they report can be verified, audit-
ing must take place, and penalties for non-compliance should be 
high. 
The success of a carbon tax depends, to a large extent, on the 
quality of its design and implementation. The dual goals of envi-
ronmental soundness and actual administrability constantly con-
flict. A carbon tax, if carefully designed, can be administered 
adequately and can also serve to reduce the threat of global 
warming. 
B. Reevaluation Over Time 
In administering a carbon tax over time, officials should periodi-
cally reassess its effectiveness. Changes in industry structure, im-
provements in technology, and expansion of scientific information 
regarding the consequences of global warming necessitate this peri-
odic reassessment of the tax's design. Any of these dynamics may 
affect how the tax should be structured. 
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C. Choice of Policy Tools 
The desirability of a carbon tax depends, to a large extent, on 
how its efficiency in reducing carbon-dioxide emissions compares 
with that of other avenues such as direct regulation. Other tax 
measures could also be implemented to promote environmental 
goals, including quick depreciation, or immediate expensing, of en-
ergy-efficient equipment instead of capitalization and investment tax 
credits for research and development directed at improving either 
energy efficiency or the availability of cleaner fuels. To reduce or 
stabilize carbon dioxide emissions effectively, it will probably be 
necessary to institute a variety of policy options, including both tax 
and regulatory policies. Those programs which currently promote 
fossil-fuel use should be reduced or eliminated. Congress should 
consider the relative expenses of running different programs in de-
termining the mix of policy devices to be used and should choose a 
mix that sufficiently reduces carbon dioxide emissions at the least 
possible total cost to economic welfare. 
D. Reasons to Act Unilaterally 
Unilateral action by the United States would provide benefits suf-
ficient to justify instituting an environmental policy against carbon 
dioxide even if no other nation followed suit. Unilateral action 
would prepare the United States to be more competitive by reduc-
ing consumption of one major production input (allowing U.S. in-
dustry to deal more easily with future supply shocks). If any 
international carbon dioxide-reduction agreements were to be nego-
tiated in the future, unilateral action by the United States now 
would facilitate compliance with such a treaty.164 It would also im-
prove the United States' image in the world community and in-
crease the probability that other countries or the European 
Community would adopt its own emissions-reduction policies.165 
Without United States' action, other countries would have little in-
centive to decrease their own emissions because the United States 
emits twenty-five percent of worldwide carbon dioxide.166 Taking 
164. 137 CoNG. REc. supra note 15, at 1110; telephone interview with Mamie Stet-
son supra note 99. 
165. Jennifer Woodward, Turning Down the Heat: What United States Laws Can Do 
to Help Ease Global Warming, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 203, 217 (1989). See also RoonR 
FISHER, GETIJNG TOGETHER, xiv - XV, 24, for a description of the dynamics of 
negotiation. 
166. Woodward, supra note 165, at 217 (citing The Global Environmental Protection 
Act of 1988 Joint Hearings on S. 2666 Before the Subcomm. on Hazardous Wastes and 
Toxic Substances and the Subcomm. on Environmental Protection of the Senate Comm. 
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unilateral action would also make it possible for other nations to 
follow the example because any technological developments to im-
prove efficiency of fossil-fuel use or to make alternative energy 
sources more readily available probably could not be financed in 
most of those other countries.167 The above factors all point to-
wards U.S. adoption of a unilateral emissions-reductions policy. 
on Environment and Public Works, tOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 286 (1988), at 364); 134 
CoNG. REc. D1155 (1988)(statement of Dr. Irving Mintzer of the World Resources 
Institute). See also CBO: CARBON CHARGES, supra note 8, at 7. 
167. See Section II.C.4.c on international competitiveness. 
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